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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a theoretical and empirical examination of the impact 
of New Commonwealth immigration during 1951-66 on the welfare of the 
indigenous population of the United Kingdom.
Chapter I concentrates mainly on the pattern of New Commonwealth 
immigration in the post-war period and the effect of immigration laws.
The experiences of the other West European countries are also briefly 
examined.
Chapter II surveys previous theoretical analyses of the welfare 
implications of immigration.
Chapter III surveys the empirical literature on the economic impact 
of immigration with particular reference to the United Kingdom and West 
European experience and points to the differences in approach between 
that of the empirical researchers and the theoretical models discussed . 
in Chapter II,
Chapter IV builds upon the work of the previous theoretical 
contributors and develops a framework that will enable the empirical 
estimation of the welfare impacts. A distinction is made between the 
non-traded and traded sectors, and for each of these sectors certain 
modifications are introduced to make the analysis more relevant for the 
United Kingdom experience: these include the provision of welfare 
services and tariffs and taxes.
And finally, Chapter V presents the empirical estimates. The 
research suggests that immigration brought a small welfare loss for 
the indigenous population of the United Kingdom; the magnitudes are 
between 0.14 per cent and 0.24 per cent of the net output of the 
sectors examined. An important point ^revealed by the research is that 
the losses/gains depend on the industrial distribution of immigrant 
workers.
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iINTRODUCTION
International labour migration has a long history, and has been 
due to various factors. Towards the end of the Roman Empire large
V
groups of Goths, Vandals and.other tribes migrated to Europe because 
of the drying up of grazing grounds in central Asia. Since the 16th 
century the major long-distance migration has been from Europe to the 
Americas. At first this involved individuals or small groups who 
wished to escape political or religious persecution, but subsequent 
migration has been mainly due to a desire to obtain a higher economic 
standard of living.
The heyday of international migration was in the half century
before the First World War during which period over 50 million people 
1 . .migrated. This migration was predominantly from Europe to the 
Americas and to the colonies, though there was also considerable intra- 
European migration. Migration to the newly discovered regions, which 
was paralleled by capital movements, was employed on the plentiful land 
in those countries and was of considerable importance in their economic 
development. It also benefited the European countries through the 
production of cheap food and raw materials that it made possible.
The importance of intra-European labour migration was in its 
contribution to the growth of industrialization. A basic precondition
^Up to 1860, the majority of these emigrants (66%) came from Britain.
A further 22% came from Germany. After 1860, the largest contingents 
of overseas migrants came from Italy, Spain, and Eastern Europe. The 
peak of the overseas exodus was reached at the turn of the century; 
from 1880 to 1914 the U.S. received 22 million immigrants.
2 .
for industrialization in the 19th century Europe was the existence 
of labour reserves. Peasants and artisans who had lost their 
livelihood through competition from the new capitalist methods of 
production flooded into the new industrial towns, often in foreign 
countries, to become part of the labour force. For example, in 
Britain the increasing demand for labôur generated by the industrial 
revolution was initially met from the surplus of unemployed workers 
from the countryside. Later on British employers turned their eyes 
to Ireland. (In addition the Irish famine of 1822 sent tens of 
thousands of peasants to England in search of bread). By 1851 there 
were 727,000 Irish immigrants in Britain (concentrated in cities like 
Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow) forming a high proportion of labour 
force in unskilled textile occupations and in the building trades. 
Britain was not the only country in Europe which experienced immigration 
in the 19th century. In France, Germany and Switzerland too once the 
landless rural labour force could no longer meet the demand for 
labour in the new industrial areas, foreign labourers were brought in.
At first most of the immigrants came from neighbouring areas. Later, 
immigrant workers were employed by industry and were attracted away 
from the frontiers, to Paris, Lyon in France, and to the Ruhr and the 
eastern parts in Germany. (In 1907 there was a total of 800,000 
foreign workers in Germany, and they made up 4.1 per cent of the total 
labour force),
In addition to these movements there was the migration caused by 
political, changes: for example, the 120,000 Jews who settled in Britain 
between 1875 and 1914 were refugees who left Russia to escape 
persecution. The First World War disrupted the migratory patterns which 
had been developing throughout Europe for the previous five or six
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decades. Thousands of more or less firmly established immigrants 
left Germany, France and Switzerland. Only in Britain were the main 
immigrant groups unaffected - except the citizens of German or 
Austrian extraction. At the same time, countries like France and 
Britain which suffered considerable manpower shortages during the war 
began to recruit workers in their col^onies.
During the interwar period, migration to most Western European 
countries was on a considerably smaller scale than before.the First 
World War. However, in Germany the change to a centrally directed 
war economy after 1933 led to a renewed demand for labour and, as a 
result, agreements for the recruitment of labour were made with 
neighbouring countries ; in addition during the war very large numbers 
of foreign workers were used to replace the eleven million German men 
withdrawn from the labour force for military service.
Development of Migration Since 1945
Since 1945 millions of people have migrated from the under­
developed parts of Southern Europe, Africa, Asia and South America to 
Western Europe, The reasons underlying these migratory movements have 
varied considerably. There have been the expatriates returning home 
from the former empire and colonies (e.g. Englishmen .from India and 
Pakistan, the French from Algeria and the Dutch from Indonesia) and < 
also hopeful immigrants from newly independent ex-colonies to the 
metropolitan countries (i.e. Britain, France, and Holland). In 
addition there have been ’political’ emigrants: East Germans to West 
Germany, Hungarians and Czechs to many West European countries, and 
Asians from the former East African colonies to the United Kingdom.
' / ' ■ U ' 'V ■ V.kjt
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The most important category, tiowever, has. been workers from the countries 
of the .British Commonwealth to the United Kingdom and from the less 
industrialized South European countries to their Northern neighbours.
The precise number of foreign migrants in Western Europe is not
known with certainty. Hume estimated^ that there were about 9 million
such immigrants in 1971, of whom about 8 million were workers.'
According to Castles and Kosack the total of immigrants into Western
Europe amounted to 10.8 million, although most of the national data on
2which this estimate was based were for years before 1970 . In January 
1974, the European Commissioner for Social Affairs estimated the number 
of migrant workers at 11,5 million. The main countries of immigration 
have been France and Germany; these two countries have over three- 
quarters of Western Europe's foreign workers, who originated from the 
Mediterranean recruitment countries, followed by Switzerland, Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands.
Post-War Immigration into the United Kingdom
The post-war immigration into the U.K. may be divided into three 
principal flows: from the Irish Republic, from foreign countries and 
from the Commonwealth.
As mentioned above, the Irish have been coming to this country
since the early 19th century, and are the largest single immigrant
nationality in the U.K. During the Second World War the demand for
1 ' \I.M. Hume, Some Economic Aspects of Labour Migration in Europe since
World War II, cited by Suzanne Paine, Exporting Workers: The Turkish
Case, CUP, 1974.
2Castles and Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western 
Europe, IRR, OUP, 1973.;
.'.I. - . , .3  ... . .-j
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labour in the U.K. led to direct recruitment in Ireland, and after 
the War a strong current of immigration continued, though falling 
steeply in the sixties.
The immigrants from foreign countries were mai ly European workers,
recruited by the Ministry of Labour t;o alleviate labour shortages in
• 1 . ■Britain , They consisted of three groups: 100,000 members of the
Polish armed forces, their dependants, and 85,000 persons of many 
nationalities. , ■
The basic feature of. the post-war migratory trends, however, has
been the rapid enlargement,of the proportion of Commonwealth and
colonial immigrants: it rose from about 22 per cent in 1951 to 29 per
2cent in 1961 and 38 per cent in 1966 . Another, and more important, 
feature is that this rise in the share of the Commonwealth, has been 
wholly accounted for by immigration from the New Commonwealth 
countries, (This is in fact why I wanted to examine the welfare 
implications of New Commonwealth immigration in the empirical chapter 
- i.e. Chapter V), The first arrivals came from the West Indies 
early in the fifties - many of them had worked in the war industries, 
particularly in factories on Merseyside,
With the growth of the British economy and the shortages of 
labour (and the increasing stringent controls on immigration to the 
U.S.A.) the numbers increased steadily: by 1956 the annual rate of 
immigration was 30,000. The rate declined in the late fifties due to
^Since 1951 there has been no organized recruitment of labour. 
2K. Jones and A.D. Smith, the Economic Impact of Commonwealth 
Immigration, CUP, 1970, p.7,
6 .
the recession in Britain, but numbers soon picked up again: some 
98,000 persons immigrated between the beginning of 1961 and the 
middle of 1962. Immigration from India and Pakistan got under way
later than the. West Indian current but also lept to a very high
1 . ', . ■level after I960" . Net inward immigration from the New Commonwealth
between 1955 and 1968 totalled 669, 6<^ tD - this included 200,130 Indians,
145,960 PakistanS, 191,330 Jamaicans, and 132,220 persons from the rest • 
2of the Caribbean.
The latest available estimates show that in 1971 the total New
Commonwealth population was 1,121,440 showing an increase of nearly
350 per cent over 1966, It has also been shown that during the same 
period there has been a relatively low increase in the overseas born 
New Commonwealth immigrants, and a relatively high increase in the 
numbers born in this country.
Table I summarizes most of what has been said so far.
Post-War Immigration Into Other West~European Countries
The immigration patterns experienced by other important Western- 
European immigration countries have shown certain similarities to the 
British experience. In France immigration was high in the five 
immediate post-war years, but economic conditions led to a slow-down of
1 . . . . " ,The increase in arrivals from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent
reflected the anticipation of legislation on immigration control. The 
implications of this will, be considered below.
2 . , . . .  . ' .See, Colour, Citizenship and British Society, by Nicholas Deakin, London
Panther, 1970, p.52. It should be noted here, however, that throughout the 
postwar period, considerable numbers of people have emigrated from Britain, 
mainly to the 'white' Commonwealth and the USA. Apart from the period 1958- 
63, emigration has constantly exceeded immigration.
^Census 1971, The Coloured Population of Great Britain, preliminary Report 
by G.B. Gillian Lomas, The Runnymede Trust, Nov. 1973, Tables 1.1,1.2,1.3.
7.
TABLE I
Birthplaces of the de facto population of EnglancM-Wales 1961, 1966, 1971
1961 1966 1971
Place of Birth Number % Number % Number %
United Kingdom 43,765,750 94.9 44,408’830 94.2 45,585,200 93.5
Irish Republic* 682,900 1.5 698,600 1.5 675,870 1.4
Old Commonwealth 99,270 0.2 112,560 0,2 128,875 0.3
New Commonwealth 282,090 0.6 . 829,750 1.8 1,1.21,440 2,3
’Coloured’ 239,690 0.4 729,910' 1.4 1,002,740 1.9
'Non-coloured' 42,400 0.2 99,840 0.3 118,700 0.4
Foreign Countries : •
in „Europe 519,610 1.1 559,850 1.2 .603,420 1.2
America 109,990 .0.2 105,020 0.2 120,055 0.2
Elsewhere and not 
stated 564,360 1.2 358,870 0.8 417,210 0.9
Visitors to U.K. 82.,590 0.2 ,62,030 0.1 97,505 0.2
Total (all 
countries of birth) 46,106,560 100 47,135,510 100 48,749,575 100
including Ireland, part not stated.
Sources: 1961 Census, Birthplace and Nationality Tables 
1966 Sample Census, Summary Tables 
1971 Census, Population and Birthplace Tables
Table has been taken from: Census 1971, The Coloured Population of 
Great Britain, Preliminary-Report, by G.B. Gillian Lomas, Runnymede 
Trust, 1973.
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immigration in the early fifties, followed by a substantial increase in
1956-58. The anti-inflationary measures of 1958 caused a new decline
in entries, but immigration picked up again after 1961. . In both 1964
and 1965 over 150,000 new workers entered France. The figure then
dropped again to about 90,000 in 1958. But 1970 witnessed thé record
1number of new immigrant workers totalling 174,245 . In addition to the 
temporarily recruited workers, large numbers of seasonal workers have 
also been recruited every year, mainly to be employed in agriculture 
for six to nine,months.
Due to the war destruction, economic disorganization and eight
million expellees from thé lost eastern provinces, West'Germany Iiad
considerable unemployment in the early second half of the 1940's.
Economic recovery after the 1948 currency reform was so rapid, however,
that all the unemployed were soon absorbed into the labour force, and
by the late fifties serious labour shortages were being felt. Initially,
most of the relatively small number of foreign workers came from the
neighbouring countries of Austria and the Netherlands. Later on,
however, growing labour needs led to the organized recruitment of labour 
2abroad . . (The first agreement was concluded with Italy in 1955. Spain 
and Greece followed this in i960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, and
1 ■ . ' ' ‘ .See S. Castles and G. Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class ’Structure in
Western Europe, IRR, 1973, p.32.
2It should be noted here, however, that in the beginning .there was an 
unspoken assumption that Germany was not a country of immigration. It 
considered the import of foreign labour as a temporary expedient with 
which to overcome unusual demand pressure and believed that the migrants 
would return home when the economy returned to its normal pace. The 
economic recession of 1967. s-eemed at the outset ..to confirm the original 
notion of Kunjun^tçir*puffer, i,.e.- the import of foreign labour when it 
is needed during a boom and its re-export during a' recession.•
! V' i. ' '■ ■■f, - *'• 1 >:■* ■ - '
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Yugoslavia in .1.968) . In the ea3:1 y sixties thé foireign laboui: force 
reached the million mark, and by 1966 there were 1.3 million foreign ' • 
workers. The recession of 1966-7 caused a sharp cut-back. Then 
economic recovery brought a new wave of,immigration, more rapid than 
ever. In 1969, 646,000 new foreign workers entered the country, and 
by the autumn of 1.970 the foreign labopr force totalled over two million.
Switzerland experienced an intense shortage of labour immiediately
after the war, which they started to fill with readily available Italians.
Throughout the.post-war period the Italians have remained the-biggest
immigrant group. (Their share in the foreign population was 55 per cent
at the end of 1969). Large groups of immigrants have also come from
Germany,. France, and Austria, but their share in the foreign population
has declined fairly steadily, while the number of immigrants from more
distant countries like Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey has • -
'significantly increased. Immigrants from this latter source mostly came 
through recruitment agreements concluded with these countries.
The temporarily recruited migrants serve the same purpose in the 
labour importing countries. They are usually recruited on the basis of 
a fixed period employment contract: it is expected that, in the normal 
course of events, the migrant will return to his country of origin after 
his contract has elapsed; if the host country still faces a labour 
shortage, the migrant is usually replaced by another foreign worker. He 
is recruited solely because of his ability to work, and is discouraged 
from bringing non-working dependants.
Legal Conditions of Entry and Problem of Citizenship
This section examines the evolution of the United Kingdom
10. i
Legislation pertaining to immigration and the effects of these on the 
pattern and composition of immigration.
The British Nationality Act of 1948 established two broad 
categories of British citizenship: citizens of Independent Commonwealtli 
countries and citizens of the remainder of what had been the Empire 
described for the purpose as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. 
Immigrants from the Independent Commonwealth countries and from the 
Colonies enjoyed the right of free entry and were assumed to possess 
full civil rights. * ' .
This situation continued through the 1950’s. In 1962, however, 
the British government introduced the Commonwealth Immigration Act which
modified the definition of citizenship as applied to Commonwealth and
. , ’ 1Colonial subjects and also placed controls over the entry of (i) citizens
of the independent Commonwealth and (ii) of those citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies whose passports were issued locally. In addition, 
the civil rights of the newcomers were redefined: they became liable to 
deportation from the U.K. if convicted of an offence within five years 
of arrival. Moreover, the separation of their families by law also 
became possible.
the 1962 Act also introduced a system under which Commonwealth 
citizens intending to work in Britain had to apply for work vouchers 
from the Department of Employment and Productivity (then the Ministry 
of Labour). There were three categories of vouchers: Category A was 
for those with a definite offer of employment; these could only be applied
1 .Controls in the form of work vouchers. The nature o f ,these will be 
clearer below.
11
for by the would-be employer of the worker. Category B was for those
possessing particular skills or qualifications and could be applied for
by any Commonwealth citizen. Category C was for those people without
the defined skills and without any definite jobs arranged before their
jarrival; the issue of ’C ’ vouchers ended in 1964 .
Since 1952 most inmiigrants have been inactive wives and children,
coming to join men already present. Between July 1962 and December
1968, only 77,966 voucher holders were admitted, compared with 257,220 
2dependants . The trends have been such that, in 1963, as much as 40% 
were voucher holders and only 34% dependants (the rest being.students, 
etc.); a picture which by 1966 had changed radically to one of 8% 
voucher holders arid 69% dependents.
Thus, the Act had an important impact on the timing, pattern, and 
the composition of inmiigration. In the period before it came into 
effect, immigration consisted predominantly of economically active 
persons. Many of these people had come here with the intention of 
staying for a few years only in order to save money. But after the Act 
many more migrants decided to remain more or less permanently and bring 
their families with them. The significance of the qualitative change in 
the composition of the immigrant community will be clearer in chapter V.
In August 1965 the Labour government issued a White Paper outlining 
more stringent restrictions on the rights of immigrants from the
- -  ^ ^  ~
For a good examination of the, effects of employment vouchers see A.
Bottomley and G. Sinclair, Control of Commonwealth Immigration, Runnymede 
Trust publication.
2 , . . . . . .See Nicholas Deakin, Colour and Citizenship and British Society, London,
Panther, 1972, p.52.
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Commonwealth (Crand. 2379, Immigration from the Commonwealth, London,
IIMSO 1965) . The I'Jhite Paper placed considerable emphasis on the
desirability of defining new and restricted terms under which newcomers
could reside here and be permitted to bring their families to this
country. It also imposed a ceiling on the total number of work vouchers
to be issued annually. This was fixed’at 8,500, of which 1,000 were
earmarked for Malta, the rest to be distributed between all other
1Commonwealth countries and dependencies.
The 1965 White Paper.can be taken as the first systematic review
of immigration policy and attempt to define remedies: Part III deals
with policies of integration "thus indirectly recognizing differences
2between two categories of British citizens", (while part II, drafted 
by the. Home Office, deals with restriction of immigration and the means 
by which it is to be. controlled). Hiro is of the opinion .that by 
recommending policies of integration, the Labour government "showed 
some realism on the subject"^ while Rose^ believes that these policies 
eventually proved inadequate. ■
In March 1968 the Labour Government curtailed the entries of East 
African Asians, who had been rushing to get to Britain because of the 
laws introduced in Kenya forbidding Asians to trade in certain areas. 
These Asians held British passports and had been guaranteed the right
1 .It should be pointed out here that after 1965 the majority of voucher 
holders have been skilled workers,-
2Dilip Hiro: Black British, White British, Pelican, 1973, p.57.
^ibid. p.57 
4E.J.B. Rose, Colour and Citizenship, p.203.
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‘of entry by previous governments. In the words of the Opposition Green
Paper on ’Citizenship, Immigration and Integration' the 1968 Act "involved
breaking of a pledge given expressly or/implication to the East African
Asians at the time of, Kenyan independence in 1963. This pledge was that
they should enjoy an unfettered right of entry into Britain so long as
they retained their citizenship of the U.K. and Colonies. By relying on
this pledge, many lost the right to acquire local citizenship in East
Africa".^  The Act defined people with undisputed right of entry to
2Britain as those having a father or grandfather in Britain . It also 
abridged the rights, established under the 1962 Act, of wives and' 
children under 16 to accompany or join the head of the household in Britain: 
after 1968 children under 16 could'enter the U.K. only if both parents live 
in the country. Aged, dependent parents over 65 years old, and, in some 
circumstances, cliildren of 16 yo 18 may come, at the discretion of the3Home Secretary.'
Even before the passing of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act,
Britain had always'followed a restrictive policy towards immigrants from 
non-Commo.nwealth countries. Foreigners wishing to come to Britain to work 
are issued with labour permits only if no British worker is available for 
the job and they may have to leave the country if they lose the job. They 
need permission to change jobs. They get security and freedom to change jobs 
only when they are 'accepted as residents' which, as the Home Office puts it,
1 •See 'Passports and Politics', p.91, by D. Humphry and M-. Ward, Penguin 
Special, 1974 .2It may be worth mentioning here that in 1970 the European Commission on Human 
Rights held that Britain had discriminated on grounds of race against the 
Asians by passing the 1968 Act, as a result of which the Conservative 
Government announced in June 1971 that the number of entry vouchers available 
to U.K. passport holders in East Africa would increase from 1,500 to 3,000. 
(According to the 1968 Act the voucher is granted to the head of the family; 
he may bring his wife and children and parents over'65 with him).
3 . .See 'Colour and Citizenship in the U.K.', 1969, I.R.R. Facts Paper, p.16.
The same paper also informs us that the overwhelming- majority of 
Commonwealth immigrants that, have been coming to Britain after 1968 are 
the wives and children of heads of households resident in Britain - which, 
in a way, means that the effects of 1962 and 1968 Acts resemble each other.
14.
3." is usually after four years". The 1968 Act appears to put the Irish 
immigrants in more or less the same position as aliens;
1971 Immigration Act in effect brought the regulations for Commonwealth
immigrants into line with the existing ones.for aliens. (It also made the
situation of immigrants in Britain similar to that prevailing in the other
immigration countries of Western Europe).' Under the Act the Commonwealth
immigrant worker is here only to work and no longer has the automatic
right to settle enjoyed under the previous Commonwealth Acts. During the
first five years of the immigrants’ stay in the U.K. a very tight control
is exercised on where the iirmigrant works and abides ; if the migrant
2becomes unemployed he may be repatriated.
Before we consider the regulations of entry and the legal status of 
foreign workers in other Western European immigration countries it is in 
order to say a few words about the implications of joining the EEC for 
Commonwealth immigrants.. The British position on this is, as Bohning puts 
it'’very restrictive’ - i.e. citizens of the U.K. and Colonies wâthout the 
"right of abode" in the U.K., and this means almost all of them after the 
1971 Immigration Act, do not enjoy the right to move freely through the 
EEC. All British dependent territories are offered association under 
Part. IV of the Treaty of Rome. The presumption of Article 135 in Part IV 
is that freedom of movement shall not extend to populations is associated 
territories unless the Council of Ministers unanimously agrees to the 
contrary. Furthermore, U.K. passport holders need to qualify for 
inclusion in the EEC's free movement system by undergoing the residence 
qualification for patriality. And finally, Commonwealth citizens resident 
in this country are not covered by free movement simply because they are 
free of immigration controls or have stayed here continuously for five 
years or more: they have to be registered as citizens of the U.K. and 
colonies.
^Ibid. p.18.
2 .We consider the legal status and the industrial distribution of immigrant 
workers in the other Western European countries in the following pages ' 
(pp.15-21).
3 . . . • . ■See W.R, Bohning 'The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and
the European Community, IRR, Oxford, 1972, p. 133-4. Chapter 9 of this
book is specifically on the problem of.U.K. nationality with regard to
the British entry.
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Legal Conditions of Entry and Problem of Citizenship in some other 
Western European Countries:
A1though‘showing certain similarities, the legal conditions of 
entry and problem of citizenship are, on the whole, quite dissimilar 
in the other Western Eruopean countries. The following lines are a 
brief review of these aspects.
The French Government decided to encourage immigration for
demographic and economic reasons immediately after the War. The Office
National d 'Immigration (O.N.I.) was set up in 1945 and recruitment
agreements were concluded with all the main labour-supplying countries
- the first country to do so in Western Europe. However, with the
increasing demand for labour the system of organized labour recruitment
became inadequate and the O.N.I. has lost its monopoly of recruitment.
A very high proportion of foreign workers have entered clandestinely 
1(82% in 1968) . To cope with this situation the French authorities had 
initially evolved a process known as 'regularization': once the 
clandestine worker has found a job he may apply for residence and labour 
permits, which are granted subject to a satisfactory medical examination.
A reorientation of immigration policies in 1968 'reiterated the
- principle that all immigrants should come through ONI but laid down
that all clandestine immigrants should be deported, instead of being 
2regularized . In 1972 and 1973 restrictions on new entrants were also 
introduced.
^See Bilan de vingt anees d 'inmiigration 1946-56, p.9; statistiques de 
1'immigration'1968, cited in Castles and Kosack, op. cit., p.34.
^See . ifcilcL. pp 32-6
i. >
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Immigrants to West Germany have in theory been required to get a ' 
labour permit and visa before their arrival. In practice, however, 
this stipulation,was not strictly enforced: during periods of severe 
labour shortage many migrants entered on tourist passports and obtained 
a work permit on finding a job. Under the policy change of March 1971 
immigrants were given permits which normally allowed the migrant to 
work in a named workplace for one year; they had to apply for renewal 
of the permit'. The longer the worker stayed the more rights he received; 
for example, after ten years of residence the worker could receive a 
work permit without any time limit.
In June 1973, the government introduced new regulations designed 
to discourage the employment of temporarily recruited workers. In
1November 1973, recruitment of non-EEC immigrant workers was banned , 
and in January 1974, it was proposed to encourage those already in 
Germany to return home by paying them a gratuity (of between £.165 and 
£230 a head)
Switzerland is without doubt the country where the employment of 
foreigners has had the most obvious repercussions. On the one hand,
immigration has quickly taken on a.structural character and, on the .other,
. 3 . . .as Maillât notes , immigration policy has been practically the sole
1Although this policy was attributed to the oil crisis, it is more 
probable that this was merely a catalyst which made the change in immigration 
policy politically feasible for governments whicli felt tliat this was the only 
way to cope with the social and political problems.recruitment of foreign 
labour had led. .jWk
2For more detailed information on the requirements of entry and on the situât.I 
of migrant workers in Germany see (a) W.R, Bohning, Foreign Workers in West 
Germany, The New Atlantis, Vol.II, N o .1, pp.12-38 and (b) Suzanne Paine, 
Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case, CUP 1974. The above information has beei 
taken from the latter source.
3For a summary of D. Maillat’s work on the Swiss situation see 'The Effects 
of the Employment o,f Foreign Workers', OECD, 1974.
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instrument at the disposal of the Federal Government for direct 
intervention in economic activity. , Recruitment is left to the employers, 
but the government does exercise strict control over the admission and 
residence of foreigners. It has been an official policy to maintain a 
rapid turnover of foreign workers in order to prevent their gaining 
residence rights and settling down.
In 1964 the Federal Council ordered firms to reduce their foreign 
personnel and in addition introduced more restrictive measures with 
regard to entry. These restrictive measures have led, however, to a 
more settled immigrant population with a higher proportion of non­
working dependants - a situation similar to that in Britain since 19.62.
After undergoing changes of varying importance, the system was radically 
transformed from 1970 onwards. The main features of the present scheme 
arc:
(i) ..the aim of stabilizing the number of active foreigners;
(ii) relaxation of the, restrictions concerning occupational 
and geographical mobility of workers on annual permits;
(iii) allocation of newly admitted workers by cantons, and
responsibility by the same cantons for the redistribution
1of labour amongst enterprises.
Industrial Distribution of Immigrants
The industrial and geographical distributions of the immigrant 
workers is of significance in determining the economic effects on the , 
recipient countries. For one thing, the industrial distribution
^For more detail see Maillat's work in C
11
influences the extent to which immigration facilitates changes in the 
economy's structure. . Secondly, as will be shown in chapter V, the 
industrial distribution affects the relative prices of various goods 
and services and, in turn, this has an affect on economic welfare. On 
the other hand, concentration in certain industries may lead to 
concentration in certain geographic areas and this may raise, social 
problems of overcrowding in housing, schools, etc.
Industrial Distribution of New Commonwealth Immigrant Workers in the U.K.
K. Jones and A.D. Smith, in their book 'The Economic Impact of 
Commonwealth Immigration', analyse the industrial (and occupational and 
geographic) distribution of New Commonwealth immigrant and total labour
forces in Great Britain. What follows is a brief summary of their
. . 1analysis and conclusions.
By classifying the immigrant labour force into the various
industries of United Kingdom standard industrial classification, they
examine whether immigrants in general arid New Commonwealth immigrants in
particular are found in disproportionately large or small numbers in any
industries. Their view is that for the period till 1966 ''it can hardly
be claimed that the industrial distribution of immigrant workers is very
2different from that of the labour force as a whole" , and that "in this 
period, New Commonwealth immigrants had essentially an across-the-board, 
scale effect on the British labour force, but did relatively little 
either to modify the existing occupational and industrial pattern or 
the manner in which it was changing. Despite the large contribution 
which New Commonwealth workers made to the increase in the British
labour force in the period 1961-6, its structural impact, even at the
_ . : '  ^
Since we can safely assume that there are no New Commonwealth workers in 
Northern Ireland, this analysis can be applied to the United Kingdom as well
2 .op.cit. p.76.
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■ jmargin, was relatively small" '
An important question is whether such findings depend on the type 
of industrial classification used. In other words, we need to ask how 
the various industries should be aggregated for the purpose. As is 
argued more fully in chapter IV, the v,&irious industries should be 
aggregated so as to make a distinction between traded and non-traded 
sectors and, moreover, within the former a distinction should be made 
between thq import competing and export industries, and within the 
latter a distinction should be made according to whether prices are 
market determined or fixed by institutional factors.
, 2With this in mind I used the data from Jones and Smith to calculate 
the ratios of the New Commonwealth and indigenous labour forces for these 
sectors and industries. This is shown in Table II.
Although no industry can be unambiguously defined as 'importer' or
'exporter', agriculture + food have been treated as the import-competing
industry and manufacturing as the export industry since the U.K. has
traditionally been a net importer,(exporter) for the former (latter) sector
As for the non-traded sector, the subdivision is made since the price in' in. ^  t rci n 3 po f i-
the housing industry (a subdivision of construction industry) is determined 
through the market mechanism while the price for the
professional (medical and education) services are normally determined 
outside the market.
^ibid. p.82
^ibid. Appendix Table 3.3
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It is interesting'to note in passing that the industrial
distribution of immigrant labour in France, West Germany and Switzerland
shows greater concentration than in the U.K. In France over one-third
of male foreign workers in 1968 were in the building industry, and
altogether two-thirds of male foreign workers were employed in only
four industries (building and public w^orks, engineering, agriculture
and commerce). Women workers are also highly concentrated; well over
half are employed in only three sectors: domestic service, personal
1service, nnd commerce. In West Germany the overwhelming majority of
immigrants are in manufacturing industries and building: more than one-
half of male foreign employees are in metal production and engineering
and building, while one half of the women are in textiles and clothing,
2metal production and engineering, and electrical goods. In . 
Switzerland too we find heavy concentration in certain types of 
industries: mechanical engineering, metal products, and clothing and 
textiles.
^See Table III: 5 on p.63 in [
^See Table III: 10 on p.71 in [ 1 4 ]
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INTRODUCTION
III Chapter V below I try to estimate the welfare impact of 
immigration from the New Commonwealth during 1951-66 on the indigenous 
population of the United Kingdom. ' Such an analysis obviously requires 
a theoretical framework. This chapter surveys some writings of previous 
writers and suggests how their results can be extended for our purposes.
The traditional theory of international trade teaches us that in a
perfect competition setting trade results in gains to all countries
taking part, and that trade expands till the relative commodity prices
are equalized^. But the theory has also shown that domestic distortions
3may reduce the gains from trade and even lead to a loss.
International labour migration is 'trade' in a factor of production;
this 'trade' arises, among other reasons, if relative factor prices 
differ between countries. This suggests that the welfare analysis of 
migration can-be undertaken with the same tools as are used in trade 
theory. Such analysis has previously been done by authors such as 
H ,G . Johnson ( 2 6  ), P.B. Kenen ( 6 2  ), and R.A. Berry and R. Soligo 
( ) . Now although they were concerned with the welfare implications
1Due to the unavailability of the industrial distribution, tables of the 
1971 Population Census, the calculations relating to 1971 could not be 
undertaken. •
2See P.A. Sammelson, 'The gains from international trade once again',
Economic Journal, vol. 72 (1962) pp. 820-29.
And " T I) t ! ..'ii-il hr. ,!o and Llic o’jnr'h i y.n h h , n .fnctn'r )>',
.k.-j. , dune r.p.
3 .See H.G. Johnson, 'Optimal trade intervention in the presence of domestic
distortions', R.E. Caves, P.B. Kenen and H.G. Johnson,' eds. , Trade,'
Growth and the Balance of Payments, North Holland, 1965, pp.3-34.,
of emigration for the population remaining behind, I show in this 
chapter how their analysis can be reversed and applied to the effects 
of -immigration on the indigenous population. All the situations 
considered by these writers illustrate a basic proposition: immigration 
affects the welfare of the indigenous .^population only when it affects 
the relative prices of factors and commodities. In conducting their 
analysis, these writers have assumed away domestic distortions 
introduced by government intervention, taxes and tariffs. However, our 
comparison with the international trade model suggests that distortions 
may affect their conclusions - this task will be undertaken in chapter 
IV.
The present chapter will be divided into two broad sections: the 
short-run analysis of immigration^ the long-run analysis of immigration.
In tlie first section the 
welfare implications of immigration for the indigenous population of 
(A) a closed-economy and (B) an open economy will be considered, and the 
importance of the difference between a one-product and a two-product 
economy will be emphasized alongside the importance of capital ownership 
on the part of the immigrants. In the second section the long-run 
implications for a closed economy will be dealt with and the importance 
of the differences in saving propensities between the immigrant and the 
indigenous populations will be pointed out.
Previous writers’ theoretical analyses of the, welfare effects may 
be classified into short-run and long-run models. There is, however, 
considerable similarities in the framework employed. The following 
assumptions underlie the models employed by most of the previous writers;
24.
1. there are two factors of production, capital (K) and homogeneous !
ilabour (L);
2.. factors are continuously substitutable with diminishing returns
to each factor; factor prices are flexible so that factor markets 
'are always cleared; ,
3. there are constant returns to scale (CRTS);
4.' utility functions of individuals are independent of each other;
5. marginal utility of income is assumed to be equal for all owners 
of factors of production;
6. the immigration is a once and for all affair;
7. there are no remittances to the immigrants' mother country; and 
finally,
8. external effects are assumed away.
What distinguishes the short-run and long-run models is that whereas 
in the former the supply of all factors is inelastic, in the latter case 
immigration may,affect the.level of savings and the capital stock.
SECTION I ■
The Short-run.Analysis _
We have a number of cases here depending on whether or not the host 
country engages in foreign, trade and on whether or not migration causes 
any reallocation of factors. In all cases, however, the main point is
25.
that it is only if and when immigration affects the relative factor 
prices that the welfare of the. indigenous population is affected.
A. Immigration with no foreign trade
(i) The One-Product Economy:
The simplest situation is where the host economy produces only 
one product: migration involves no reallocation of factors.
Figure I shows a case examined by Berry and Soligo (-53 ). The 
area under the MPPL curve shows the total product available from the 
given endowment of capital if combined with varying amounts of labour.
The initial stock of labour in the host country is OL]: this is 
completely inelastic with respect to the real wage. The total product 
is OACL^ and the MPPL is O E . Now suppose an immigration of L2L2 workers, win 
bring no capital with them. The total product increases to OABL2 . The 
distribution of this product is as follows: since the equilibrium wage 
rate falls to OF and since the immigrants.own no capital, their share 
will be L1DBL2 . The income of the indigenous population of the host 
country increases by DÇB or the area T : the income of capitalists goes 
up by Y + T and this more than offsets the loss to indigenous labour 
shown by Y. The reason why the home country gains is that immigration 
affects the capital labour endowment ratio in the economy and hence the 
relative factor prices. This change in the real wage along with, the 
assumption that factor rewards equal the marginal product, means that 
the intramarginal migrants contribute more to total product than their 
wage.
■An alternative way of illustrating the above conclusions is found 
in Kenen ( 6 2  ). This analysis, which makes use of a two-factor isoquant
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h.-iG the. advantage cil: showing how tlie effect of' immigra t ion on 
the host population’s welfare may depend on the elasticity of factor 
substitution. In Figure II the initial labour' force of the economy is 0 
and the capital stock is OKo, Total output is given by the isoquant P o . 
Tlie wage rental ratio is given by tan . National income* in units of 
cap i. tal is OTo of tiris OKo goes to tlic capitalists and KoTo goes to 
the workers.
Immigration increases the labour force to 0L|: the relative price 
of labour falls such that the-factor price ratio is now shown by tan 0. 
Full employment is reached when output expands to OP^. The immigrant 
labour gets AlVCD. The indigenous population as a whole now enjoys an 
income corresponding to the output level OP^ which is greater than the 
initial output level OPo. however, there is a distribution of income 
against the indigenous labour who now get only AKo. We,can see that the 
elasticity of factor substitution will determine the extent of the chan; 
in relative factor prices, as between points Fo and Ivj and hence 
influence the. effect of immigration on host country well a re.
Now let us see what happens if the immigrants were to bring some
capital witli them. . (For convenience of exposition I return to the
diagrama tic analysis of Berry and Soligo), The effect on the welfare oI
the liost country is seen to depend on wlietlicr or not the ’immigrants'
capital/labour ratio is the same as that of the indigenous'population
(since that determines whether or n o t ■immigration affects relative
factor prices). Consider first the case where the relative endowment
»differ. Let the immigrants' capital/labodr ratio be relatively lower. 
Tlie inflow of labour equals LjLg units. The inflow of capital will 
cause the MPPL. curve to pivot to the right to, say, MPPLl as shown in ["t
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III. Now if, as assumed, the production function is linear homogeneous 
the total product will increase but less than in proportion to the increase 
in the labour force. So, once again, the wage level will be reduced.
The post-immigration total product will be OABL2 such that OABL2/OACLX 
*\0L2/0L]^. The amount DBLgL^ will be the return to immigrant labour 
and AJ)^B.to immigrant capital. The indigenous population will gain the 
amount DD'^ C : this constitutes a gain to capitalists (- EFD^C) which more
than offsets the loss to labour (=EFDC).
However, if the capital/labour ratio of the immigrants were the
same as that of the indigenous population, the welfare of the latter
would not be affected. In this,case the MPPL curve would pivot to the
right to, say, MPPL as shomi in Figure IV and under constant returns to
/scale, the location of MPPL would be such that the total product would 
increase in proportion to the increase in the labour force, i.e. 
0AC^L2/0ACLj^ = OL2/OL2 . The wage level would not be affected and
2therefore the welfare of the indigenous population would remain the same . 
The amount ACc' would be the return to immigrant capital and CC'^ 'L2Lj^  to 
immigrant labour.
3ii) The Two-Product Economy
By introducing more than one product in the economy we allow for 
the possibility that immigration may lead to a reallocation of factors. 
However, .as seen below, this does not affect the basic nature of the 
conclusion reached in the previous section. .
1 ' ■ . •For an alternative exposition see H.G. Johnson (2.6 ) ..
2In terms of Figure II this possibility can be shown by shifting the 
factor price line outwards parallel to the initial line, ToTp. Now, 
the new production point will be at the point where the new factor-price 
line intersects the ray denoted by ORo.
The analysis is due to P. Kenen, op, cit.
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Suppose that the host country produces two commodities, A and B.: 
the-former is relatively capital intensive at all sets of factor prices.
And assume also that all individuals have the same tastes, with unitary 
income elasticities.of demand for each conmiodity.
Consider first the case of immigration of labour without any capital.
The initial transformation curve is ToTo in Figure V. The equilibrium
point is. E o : the country produces and consumes OBo of B and OAo of A.
National income measured in units of A is OYo. After immigration, the
transformation curve will shift outwards to, say, TpTp such that at
constant product prices, the economy will produce more of B and less of A;
1this result arises from the Rybczinski theorem which says that an increase 
in the endowment of labour brings about a rise (fall) in the production 
of the labour intensive (capital intensive) product. At constant prices 
national income would increase to OY^. However, owing to the unitary 
income elasticities of demand, consumption at constant prices would be 
OA^ of A and OB2 of B ~ i.e. there would be an excess demand for A 
(= ApA2) and an excess supply of B (= B2B2). The price of A must rise 
relative to that of B: equilibrium is restored when the price ratio is 
as shown by the line P 2 in the diagram. At this relative price the 
indigenous population enjoys the welfare level U2 which is higher than in 
the.initial situation. Note that since the relative price of the capital 
intensive product has increased, this overall gain is the net effect of 
gains for domestic capital and-loss to domestic labour.
Next consider the case where immigrants bring some capital with ‘ 
them such that their capital/labour ratio is the same as that of the . 
indigenous population. The transformation curve shifts to, say, T^T^:
1 .Rybczynski, T.M., ’Factor endowment and relative commodity prices', 
Economica, new series, vol. 22 (1955), pp.336-41. -
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in keeping with the Rybcezinski theorem TgTg will be merely a blown' 
out version of ToTo. If the two groups have identical tastes, the 
consumption and the production will now be at and relative prices 
of products and factors will not' change. The indigenous population 
will remain on the original utility level denoted by.Uo; and the 
distribution of income between indigenous labour and capital will not 
be affected either.
Thus, we find that allowing for a second product does not affect 
the conclusions reached earlier: immigration will increase welfare of 
the indigenous population.whenever if affects relative prices of' 
factors and for this to happen (in a closed economy model) the capital/ 
labour ratio of the immigrants should differ from that of the indigenous 
population.
13. Immigration with foreign trade:
Introducing foreign trade into the analysis leads, as P.B, Kenen 
( ) has shown, to a distinction between:
(i) an economy that is too small to affect its terms of trade, and
(ii) an economy that is large enough to affects its terms of trade.
The distinction is relevant since in the former case immigration can
have no effect on relative commodity prices and on relative factor prices
and hence will not affect the welfare of the indigenous population: '
any excess demand or supply caused by immigration can be satisfied by 
changes in imports and exports. The- small country case need not 
therefore be dealt with any further.
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Immigration to a * large coüiitry'
The effect of labour immigration on the welfare of the indigenous 
population will depend on how it affects the host country’s, terms of 
trade. Within the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin model the terms of ' 
trade change will depend on (i) whether the host country initially 
exported or imported the labour intensive product as well as on
(ii) the capital/labour ratios of the immigrants.
In Figure VI the country initially exports' product B which is 
relatively labour intensive. Production equilibrium is at Eo on the 
transformation curve ToTo while consumption is at Co on the budget 
line YoZo: the trade triangle is ACoEo. Now allow immigration of 
labour with no capital. Following the Rybczinski theorem, we see that 
at the initial prices there will be an excess supply of B and an 
excess demand for A. The terms of trade of the host country will 
deteriorate. The indigenous population will therefore suffer a welfare 
loss: its equilibrium is nox-r on the indifference-curve Uj^ .
In Figure VII the host country initially imports the labour- 
intensive product: ACo of B are obtained in exchange for AEo of A. 
Following immigration (x<?ith no capital) the constant-price consumption 
point will be Cj and the production point E^.' This will cause an excess 
supply of B and therefore the terms of trade move in favour of the 
country: relative prices are noxv shown by Y 2Z2 . The indigenous 
\ population will enjoy a gain in welfare: their equilibrium will be on 
the indifference curve U 1 .
1 • . 'Note that the analysis assumes a policy of free trade on thé part of the -
large country. This situation is not optimal and because of this 
immigration.may worsen the country's welfare. This point has already been 
recognized by Dutta ( 1 3  ).
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Summary and conclusion.for tlio shorL-run analysis
The general conclusion that emerges from the analysis so far is 
that immigration will affect the welfare of the indigenous population 
only if it affects the relative prices of products and factors. In a 
closed economy model this result depends on whether or not the 
immigrants' capital/labour ratio differs from that of the indigenous, 
population. I'J^ hen trade is allowed into the model, the welfare change 
depends on whether or not the terms of trade of the host country is 
•affected and, if it is affected, in what direction (which is shown to 
depend on the initial trade pattern of the host country).
Why Migrate? '
Before we turn to consider the long-run implications of immigration 
let us digress for a moment. In the analysis so far, we have considered 
only the effects of immigration on the indigenous population. However, 
the incentive for immigration has not been examined: in other words, 
immigration has been taken as granted. One would expect the economic 
reason behind migration to be higher earnings in foreign countries, 
and that (in the absence of any restrictions) migration would’ continue 
until relative factor returns were equalized throughout the world.
Peter Kenen has shown^ how this can be incorporated within a modified 
lleckscher-Ohlin .model.
In addition to the assumptions already made we now also assume 
that the production functions of one country display a product-neutral 
factor-neutral superiority in economic efficiency. This will mean that
^See op. cit.
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although under free trade relative factor prices will be equalized 
between countries, the absolute marginal products will be higher in 
the one country. Thus, the inter-country differences in technology 
create the incentive for migration.
Under these conditions migration vwill increase the incomes of
migrants and increase 'world' demand for both commodities. Now if
only labour had migrated world output of the labour intensive products
would increase (at constant prices) while output.of the other product
would be reduced. The relative price of the former will decrease
1redistributing income in favour of capital within each country . So, 
if the host country exports the capital (labour) - intensive product, 
immigration will increase (decrease) the welfare of its indigenous 
population.
■ SECTION II
The effects of Labour Immigration on the Indigenous Population in the Long-Ruî
The preceding analysis may be thought of as a short-run analysis in 
the sense that capital was assumed to be a stock of factor that was not 
affected by immigration. Berry and Soligo ( 5 3  ) have offered a long-run 
analysis where migration affects the amount of saving and investment.
They present their argument with reference to the effect of emigration 
on the population left behind. In this section I translate their analysis 
to the effect of immigration on the welfare of the indigenous population.
The Berry.and Soligo model envisages a closed-economy stationary 
equilibrium where, in the absence of migration, the labour force and the
^This result, if sufficiently extreme, could disappoint the expectations 
of the migrants themselves and reduce their welfare.
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capital stock would be constant over time. Their society is one where 
there is no bequeathing so that an individual saves only in order to 
redistribute the pattern of consumption over his own life. As in the 
short-run analysis, the effect of immigration on the welfare of the 
indigenous population will depend on whether or not relative factor 
prices arc affected; and by analogy wkth the short-run case, where the 
change in factor prices required that the capital/labour ratio of the 
two groups be different, what is necessary in the long-run case is that 
the propensities to save or hold wealth differ between the two groups.
In Figure VIII the curve MPPK shows the marginal physical product
of capital. The curve ST,shows the "willingness to hold yield-bearing 
1wealth" ; both of these curves refer to the indigenous population.
Each point on the ST curve is.a potential long-run equilibrium in that
2it implies no net saving.
In the initial situation the capital stock is OK^ and return per 
unit of assets held is O C . The area under the MPPK curve gives the 
total output. Note that although OCRKp represents the total return to 
capital, the net return is only CRS,the rest being the costs necessary 
to persuade part of the indigenous population to change the time 
pattern of consumption in order to save. The total return’to labour is 
ACR. ■ . - ■ . ■
Now consider the effect of immigration. As a first possibility 
assume that the willingness or propensity to hold yield-bearing assets
1See Berry and Soligo, op. cit. pu786.
2 . . . . . ■The diagram implies that the rate of return on capital will equal
the interest rate - i.e. any real world differentials between these 
two (due to,, say, risk aversion,, incomplete information) are assumed 
away.
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Figure  V III
M PPK =  the p re - im m ig ra tio n  m arg ina l physica l p roduc tiv ity  
of cap ita l curve
VW =  the propensity to hold y ie ld -bea ring  wealth curve of 
im m ig ran ts
ST =  the propensity to hold y ie ld -bea ring  wealth curve of 
the indigenous population
M P P K ’=  the p o s t-im m ig ra tio n  m arg ina l phys ica l p roduc tiv ity  
of cap ita l curve
OC =  the p re -im m ig ra tio n  re tu rns to asset holding
OC =  the p o s t-im m ig ra tio n  re tu rns to asset holding
differs as between the two groups. Specifically assume that the 
propensity is lower for the immigrant population: this is illustrated 
in Figure VIII where their asset holding curve VW lies everywhere above 
the corresponding curve of the indigenous population. The total 
willingness, to hold yield-bearing wealth is now shown by SNZ. The 
increase in the labour endowment will hause the MPPK curve to.rotate 
outwards to MPPK . (The exact location of MPPK^ will depend on the 
nature.of the production function. Under constant returns to scale, the 
location of MPPK will be such that the ratio of the areas AMC'^/AMM'' 
will equal the ratio of the immigrant to indigenous populations). The 
equilibrium capital stock, increases to OK^ and the total product 
becomes OAMK K2 . Note that although the distance of MPPK^ curve from 
the vertical axis is twice that of the MPPK curve, the increase in the 
equilibrium capital stock (and hence in the total product of the 
economy) is less than two-fold because the total willingness to hold 
yield-bearing wealth curve, SNZ, slopes upwards - i.e. the opportunity 
cost of saving and investing becomes higher as we move to the right 
along the SNZ' curve. Note also that with a return to asset holding of 
OC immigrants do not save at all. The income of the indigenous 
population increases to 0AMM'^K2 ; labour receives AC^M of this while 
capitalists receive a net income of SC^M'*. Immigrants receive AMM^ as 
returns to labour: they earn no income as capitalists since at the new 
equilibrium rate of return on capital they do not hold any assets.
It should be clear from this that the source of the gain for the 
indigenous population is the possibility of a change in the rate of 
return on capital relative to that to labour. In order to emphasise 
the point consider in Figure VIII a case where the immigrants* 
willingness to hold yield-bearing assets curve coincides with that of
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the indigenous population. The aggregate curve is ST’, which intersects 
(ft >MPPK' a-psd* R , The rate of return remains unchanged and so does the 
income of the indigenous population.
Conclusions
The conclusions that emerge from the preceding survey is that if 
the host country is initially in a Pareto-optimal situation, immigration 
will unambiguously increase the welfare of the Indigenous population 
whenever it affects the.relative prices of factors. If the country has 
no foreign trade, the change in relative factor prices requires., in the 
short run, that the capital-labour ratio of the immigrants differs from 
that of the indigenous population.^ In the long run saving propensity of 
the two groups takes the place of the capital-labour ratio.
The open economy analysis has been undertaken on the assumption that 
the host country follows free trade. Here a distinction has to be made 
between, the 'small' and 'large' country. In the former case free trade 
is the optimal policy. Immigration cannot affect the terms of trade of the 
host country and therefore cannot affect its welfare. For the large 
country case, free trade is not the optimal policy. Immigration increases 
(decreases) welfare of the indigenous population according to how it 
improves (worsens) the country's terms of trade. Moreover, as the change 
in the terms of trade may affect the relative prices of factors, there will 
be a change in the distribution of income as between the indigenous capital 
and labour.
In Chapter IV, I build upon the preceding analysis. I focus particularly
_ : - : I I j  ^ j ]
The analysis had assumed identical and homothetic.tastes in the indigenous 
and immigrant populations. If tastes were not identical (or not homothetic) 
immigration may affect relative factor prices even when the two populations 
have identical capital-labour ratios.
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on the fact that immigration occurs.in situations that are not otherwise |
Pareto-optimal. For instance, immigrants may contribute to production of !
and demand for certain non-traded services where prices are fixed by the
*  ■  Igovernment rather than determined by competitive, forces. Or it may be |
that immigrants are employed in traded-goods industries that have tariffs 
and/or taxes.. Introduction of such distortions leads to considerable 
revision of the results reviewed above.

45.
INTRODUCTION
This 'chapter surveys the empirical literature on the impact of
immigration with particular reference to the United Kingdom and West
European experience. There is a noticeable difference in.approach
between that of the empirical researchers and the theoretical models
considered in the previous chapter. The theoretical analysis was concerned
with the impact of immigration on the economic welfare of the indigenous
population of the host country: the models employed there had, like■>
models for analysing the welfare effects of changes in tariffs, assumed 
that the government of the host country could regulate aggregate demand 
and allow changes in thé foreign exchange rate (or in the commodity terms 
of trade) so as to avoid inflation and unemployment, and to keep balance 
of payments always in equilibrium. In contrast, the empirical researchers' 
have assumed constraints on government policy and been concerned with the 
effects on aggregate demand and on the balance of payments: the welfare 
implications have been almost completely neglected. Section I examines 
the impact of immigration on aggregate demand while Section II deals with 
the implications for the balance of payments. In concluding the,chapter,
I discuss whether the empirical information surveyed is of relevance for 
welfare considerations.
SECTION I 
IMMIGRATION AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
Economists' views on the effects of immigration on aggregate demand 
essentially fall into three categories: .
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(i) the net impact is inflationary in the short run but may be
deflationary in the long run;
(ii) the effect is deflationary in the short run but inflationary in
the long run; .
(iii) the effect is deflationary regardless of the time period
concerned.
Let us now consider these three views in turn;
Inflationary in the short run
According to the proponents of the first view, although immigrants 
increase total output, this is more than offset by the increase in 
expenditure (particularly on the capital goods) that is required to 
employ the immigrants. The leading advocates of this view are Mishan and 
Needleman ( ) and R. ils tow ( )  • The former model relates to the
United Kingdom experience and is therefore worth considering in detail.
The starting point of the Mishan and Needleman argument is that 
during the sixties Britain was experiencing an excess demand for goods 
which was reflected in an excess demand for labour. They set up a model 
for estimating the effects of immigration on aggregate net output,» 
aggregate net expenditure, and on the balance of payments under the 
constraint that the rate of exchange and the internal relative prices are 
held constant. The basic equation of their model is: E t ^ U t - Z t
where Et is the excess aggregate demand for net domestic product 
generated by immigration, Dt is the value of aggregate net expenditures 
on domestic goods and services, and Zt is the aggregate net value added 
to domestic product. All values are measured in terms of real factor
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cost. The expenditures consi st of the aggregate consumption expenditure, 
aggregate government expenditure, and aggregate investment expenditure 
on industrial and social capital. On the supply side is the. aggregate 
income of immigrants. The required investment in industrial capital 
is estimated from a relationship between the capital stock and income, 
and the primary increase in national income resulting from the immigrant 
inflow. The investment in social capital is estimated by assuming that 
the requirement per immigrant family grows at the average growth rate for 
the population as a whole.
The quantitative impact of immigration on excess demand depends on 
what they call the marginal investment response coefficients. These 
are and X' , respectively for industrial and social capital. These 
coefficients relate the idle capacity in the economy to the additional 
investment required to accommodate the immigrants, e.g.' approximates 
unity in cases where immigrants are provided with a new stock of industrial 
capital equal to the average while approaches unity if immigrants tend 
to settle in cities where there is least likely to be any spare social 
capital and houseroom. If both Â  and 0^  are unity, we can expfect the 
net inflow of immigrants to import on inflationary effect on the host 
country, if both are zero we expect a deflationary effect. More 
precisely we can determine some crucial values of , the 's below which 
primary excess aggregate demand is negative and above which it is 
positive.
The model was used to estimate the effect of immigration from 
Jamaica. They assumed for a value roughly equal to unity and for 
a value of not much less than unity. It was also assumed (without 
explanation) that immigrants' additional capital requirements would be
4".
met within two years of arrival. A uniform inflow of immigrants in 
the absence of emigration (or alternatively, an immigration on so large 
a scale that emigration may be disregarded) was also assumed. (The 
calculations applied to a short period over which the behaviour 
parameters remained unchanged). Their calculations show that for A  values 
below 0.1 immigration generates excess aggregate supply, and that the 
higher the growth rate the greater this excess supply^. For A  values in 
the range between 0.2 and 1.0 we have excess demand. And for given 
values of A  the higher the economy's growth rate, the greater the 
magnitude and duration of the primary excess aggregate demand.
Riistow ( 4-6 ) arrives at fairly similar conclusions in an analysis '
2of immigration into West,Germany . He estimates the expenditure, on social
and industrial capital that has to be made for each new immigrant worker
and how long it takes the worker to produce a surplus equal to that
initial investment. This procedure assumes that foreign workers cannot
be employed.by more intensive use of existing capacity. He comes to the
conclusion that "it takes six years for a.foreign worker to produce a
surplus equal to the initial capital outlay which he requires. During
this period, the effects of his presence is to create excess demand;
3only later does he create excess supply".
Inflationary .in the Long Run
In contrast to the above findings, some Swiss economists have 
suggested that immigration of labour- has a stabilizing effect in the
They say, however, that only in the event of widespread unemployment are 
the JX's likely to be so low, and that in that even immigration will act 
to intensify the. slump. ' -
^See (14 ) p.387.
3 ■ . . .Quoted in ibid. .For a fuller discussion of Rustow's model and.his 
assumptions see ibid. pp. 387-8 and ( 4 5 )  p.14.
^This section is based on ( 4"!^ ) p.l5, (14) pp388-9, and ( 4 1 )  pp.30-1
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short: run but leads to inflation in the long run; Their argument is 
basically as follows: the initial effect of immigration is to hold dotTO 
wages and maintain profit: levels. Since immigrant workers send their 
savings home and consume relatively little, they contribute far more to 
supply than to demand. It is not very clear what the. likely effects on 
investment may be. On the one hand these writers assume that little 
investment is required to employ at least the first wave of immigrant 
Workers and that hardly any new housing, hospitals., or school facilities 
are provided. On the other hand it may be argued that if immigration 
maintains profit levels' it will induce an increase in investment.
The turning point to inflation comes later. The low wage levels having 
increased profitability (particularly or labour-intensive production) will 
encourage investment.. At the same time the still relatively low price level 
leads to high demand for exports (at the prevailing exchange rate). To 
satisfy this excess demand additional foreign labour is admitted. This 
second round of immigration reinforces the whole process. In Bohnings’ 
terminology, the migration process becomes self-feeding. At a later stage, 
as the immigrant workers bring in their families, investment in new housing 
and infra-structure can no longer be postponed. An upward spiral takes 
place', which results in 'over heating' of the economy and inflation. The 
main adherents to these views are A. Gnehm ( ), E Tuchtfeldt (5"^ ),
Lutz ( ,3>t. ) , and Maillat ( /fi ) who were writing about the Swiss experience, 
and Fohl ( ;Zo ) a ad G.E. Volker ( 6 Q )  who were writing about the W. German 
experience.
Immigration is Deflationary
Not all the commentators consider immigration to have an inflationary 
effect. C.P. Kindelberger (30) has argued that the effect of immigration 
into the Western European countries has been deflationary. According to 
his theory, which is basically based upon the Lewis model of growth with 
unlimited supplies of labour, the availability of immigrant labour 
supplies, though not being the initial cause of economic expansion in 
Western Europe, has been the main factor in sustaining growth. The 
mechanism for this effect has been through the holding back of wage 
increases. Profits were able to increase thus encouraging new investment. 
Furthermore, since the immigrants had high rates of savings (which they
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remitted abroad) they contributed more to supply than to demand. As long 
as the supply of labour remains unlimited, growth continues in a self- 
generating process. It is only when labour supplies become less readily 
available that growth rates are likely -to slow down.
Using the framework of the Lewis model, Kindleberger treats the 
Western European countries as the industrial sector and the countries 
of emigration as the agricultural sector: in Germany and Switzerland 
particularly, immigrant labour sustained "the virtuous circle of exports 
leading to higher incomes, profits, and investment, .which in turn lower 
prices and stimulate exports once again"^. However, he considers that 
Britain with its low net immigration does not fit his model.. Although 
the argument is intuitively appealing it leaves some questions unanswered: 
for instance, he does not explain how immigration may affect demand 
conditions and entrepreneurs' incentives for expanding markets.
In order that immigration forestalls any inflationary effect, the 
immigrants should add more to. production than to consumption. This is 
more likely the higher is their propensity to save. Bohning considers 
that this has been the case for most West European countries. He 
relates immigrants' high saving propensity to their family composition - 
i.e. their low dependency ratio - and also points to the role played by 
remittances as a source of deflationary impact. He admits, however, 
that the net deflationary effect of the latter is more limited than 
might be imagined given the possibility that these remittances may turn 
back on the market of the immigration country in the form of consumer demand'
 ^see (30) p.3.
•^Sce (41) p.31
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G.C. Schmid ( C50 ) , Bain and Pauga ( 2. ), and Mehrlander ( 3 3 ) ,  
who were writing about West Germany provide a considerable amount of 
evidence on the dis-inflationary impact of immigration., Schmid 
suggests that "the evidence is strong that in Germany hoarding of the 
marginal worker during slack production periods has been low (or 
rather that turnover at the margin has been high) while expansion of 
employment when demand first picks up has been rapid. This has meant 
either larger profits for the German firm and, thus, relatively higher 
levels of savings and investment, or lower prices for German goods 
vis-a-vis foreign goods"^. Bain and Pauga tested the relationship 
between money wages, prices, employment of foreign workers and 
unemployment using data for eighteen industries over the period'1961-69. 
They found a good fit for a linear model where the money wages in each 
industry lagged (one or two years) behind the number of foreign workers 
employed in that industry and the number of workers unemployed in that 
industry; an increase in the level of prices was seen to cause intra­
industry money wages to rise, while an increase in the employment of 
foreign workers and the number of unemployed workers in an industry 
retarded money wages. Garbers and Blankart ( 2-i ) found that
Switzerland had had rather a similar experience: increased immigration
2control was accompanied by much sharper price increases . Maillat ( 4 1 )
shares the same opinion. Ursula Mehrlander ( 3 3  ) found that foreign
workers in W. Germany produced more than they consumed and that this may
3have damped price increases,
^See (5*0), p.252 
^Cited in ( 4 3 )  p.13
3 . . , . ■Cited in VbTker, p.72. Mehrlander calculated foreign workers' MPS at
.45 in 1967. Her results may be correct for a closed economy. For an 
open economy, however, the conclusion has to be modified, keeping in 
mind that remittances sent home are quite of ten immediately used by the 
home country to satisfy import needs.
Evaluation of the Findings
Before we go to the next section let us consider the criticisms 
levelled at the findings of the above writers. The emphasis here will 
•be on the Mishan and Needleman model because of the controversy it has 
aroused and because it is concerned with the United Kingdom experience.
1
' Major criticisms of the Mishan-Needleman analysis have been made
by K. Jones and A.D. Smith ( 2.B ). First, they say that it is not a
realistic guide to the implications of immigration flows into Britain:
whereas Mishan and Needleman were concerned with the "effects of a
large-scale immigration into any country that might occur under an open
door policy" , Jones and Smith consider that the British experience
during 1961-66 had been quite the opposite in that emigration from
Britain was running at a rate equivalent to about half that of, total 
1immigration . More specifically, Jones and Smith point out that "the
values assumed for some of the basic parameters'- the marginal
• investment responses especially - are strongly influenced by this
assumption of mass immigration and so, therefore, are the final results".
They suggest that to some extent the immigration may simply have served
to "fill in" a gap caused by a dip in the growth of the indigenous
population and by emigration; in other words some immigrant workers may
have been employed with spare industrial capacity. The (plausible)
assumption underlying this criticism is that the pattern of immigrant
demand does not differ markedly from that of the indigenous population,
the latter influencing the industrial composition of the excess
industrial capacity. The growth of shift-work in the early sixties
would also have made it possible to meet the additional demand from the
existing stock of industrial capital. They also consider that the
demand on social capital due to immigration may have been small owing
o^p.cjl. p. 143 2 .ibid. p.143-4. What follows is based on ibid. chapter 9.
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to the possibility that 4:here was much elasticity in the absorptive 
capacity of the existing stock of social capital. This was especially 
so in the case of housing.
The point about housing has also been made by David Collard 
( 1 5 )  who thinks it astonishing to assume (a) that each immigrant 
family would be.provided with a stock of social and industrial capital 
equal to the average (i.e. ^ = 1 , 3 ^ = 1 )  and (b) that this capital
would be provided over a period of two years. "Clearly it would be
more sensible to assume a lower value of the As and also a longer
. . .  . 1period, for building up the new level of capital"..
Considering together the needs of industrial and social capital
Jones .and Smith write "in terms of the additional capital formation
required, the needs of new immigrants are really quite small, probably
not more than about 2| per cent of total capital formation in the
period 1961-66, despite the fact that New. Commonwealth immigration was
responsible for almost a third of the increase, during this period, in
. 2the British population". Even if the existence of spare capacity 
were disregarded,.they consider that increase in demand and consequent 
inflationary pressure would have been small.
They also discuss the impact of immigration on the rate of increase 
of wages. Although the statistical evidence they provide suggests that, 
for the most part, occupations where the numbers of New Commonwealth 
workers were disproportionately large (in 1961) tended to enjoy above- 
average pay increases, they argue that "it might reasonably be expected 
that remuneration would have risen even more in the absence of this new 
supply of labour"^. It is also likely that the immigrants joined these
S^ee (15 ), p.74
2op . cit. .p. 16Ü .
S^ee ibi.cL , p. 154
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industries precisely'because wages there were rising more than elsewhere.
W.R. Bohning's criticism of the Mishan and Needleman model (and of 
similar models) is that they differentiate between:
(a) an indigenous population which postpones its consumption in order 
to provide capital for indigenous unemployed and thereby reap a 
higher level of future consumption, and
(b) an indigenous population which postpones consumption in order to
provide work places for immigrants. Since the immigrants may
provide future consumption goods, the foregone consumption in the
latter case is like investment in machinery. The Mishan-Needleman 
D O
distinction hasyleconomic justification - it does not matter whether
. investment is made on indigenous unemployed or in workplaces for
. . 1immigrants.
Conclusions
The survey of recent research suggests that it is difficult to be 
certain whether immigration imparts an inflationary or a deflationary 
pressure: experiences of different countries point in different directions 
What seems to be more certain, however, is that the magnitude of 
immigration plays quite an important role. Thus, in Switzerland (the 
country with the highest proportion of immigrants in its labour force) 
immigration had disinflationary effects in the short run but that later 
on its impact was inflationary. On the other hand,
^See (11), p.178
in countries where the immigrant labour force makes,up less than 5% 
of the total labour force, as in the case of the United Kingdom, it 
appears that extra demand for goods and capital will not be of such 
magnitude as to cause an inflationary pressure and the disinflationary 
effect on wages may also not be significant.
SECTION II
IMMIGRATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
, The effect of immigration on the balance of payments may be 
classified into (a) the direct effects which essentially consist of 
the direct/ quantitative impact on imports, exports, and the outflow 
of remittances, and (b) the indirect impact through the effects on 
costs and prices. .The direct impact on imports will depend on 
immigrants' incomes and import propensity. As for direct impact on 
exports, although export demand may be exogenous, immigration may have 
a direct effect if export orders can be met more easily - i.e-. by 
helping to eliminate supply bottlenecks.
Mishan and Needleman have estimated the effects of immigration into 
the United Kingdom on the balance of payments. Their model allows for 
the effect of immigration on the claims by foreigners on the currency 
of the host country, Mt,^ and the volume of exports, Xt, required to pay 
for Mt. However, since exports have an import content, Xt will always be 
greater than Mt: Xt = |"l/(l-d)jMt where d stands for the import content
of exports. Their calculations reveal that the time paths of Mt is very
1 . . ■ .Mt is the sum of net remittances and the imports induced by immigrant
generated primary expenditures on consumption, on government goods 
and services, and on investment,.
Ur;
• * , / . ^  % sensitive to the values of A  and A  , but that, irrespective of the
values of the ^ 's and the growth rates, the Mt is positive and
increasing from year to year, and that this increase is of sufficient
magnitude to more than offset the indirect price effect on the .balance
of payments that may result from any excess supply created by immigrants.
In order to restore this net imbalance» the export prices of the host
country must fall relative to foreign prices. Consequently•'the real
domestic resources needed to maintain,international balance will then
exceed those made available by the immigration. The authors consider.
only the effects of the initial expenditures of the immigrant's and
ignore any multiplier effects. They consider that the adverse effects
of the multiplier repercussions may well be. much more powerful than the
primary effects estimated.
, Unfortunately their model does not contain any estimate of
immigrant-induced exports: they justify this omission on the grounds
that "no economic model, Keynenian, Marshallian, Input-Output, or any
other assumes any direct relationship between national income, or
2domestic labour supply, and aggregate exports" . . We can argue, however, 
that immigrant workers may directly improve exports: in the short run 
they may help eliminate supply bottlenecks and in the long run, as pointed 
out by Kiudleberger ( 3 0 ) ,  immigrant labour may keep production costs 
and prices from rising and keep the country's products competitive in
Note here that the fact that the magnitude of Mt is sensitively related 
to the values of A  implies that in the model the immigrant-generated 
inflationary pressure and the adverse balance- of payments effect are 
closely related. For more details on this see ( 3 8  ), pp.41-2.
2 .
See (55), p. 103.
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the world market and home markets.^ The quantitative significance, of 
this for the United Kingdom payments is not clear. However, Castles 
and Kosack consider this mechanism an important factor' in the export.
2 3boom of West Germany and Switzerland in the fifties and early sixties *
The only evidence, to my knowledge, on the increased demand for 
imports generated by immigrants which is comparable with the Mishan- 
Needleman results is provided by Jones and Smitli who calculated the 
additional imports caused by the New Commonwealth immigrants to Britain 
between 1961 and 1966, on the assumption that imports form about the same 
proportion of immigrants’ consumption and capital requirements as they do 
of the consumption and capital requirements of the total population.
Their results "suggests additional imports of £214 million"^ which is only 
slightly less than the British current balance of payments deficit for 
the same period - £217 million - and therefore needs to be taken 
seriously.
Remittances by immigrant workers have an obvious adverse effect
pMishan and Need-fleman would agree with this to some extent "Should any 
proportion (of immigrants' output) be exported, the i.arger this is the less 
adverse the immigrants' effect on the balance of payments. But, at the same 
time, the longer will it take for their domestic supply to offset the domestic 
demand they generate" (See (38), pp.43-4). There seems to be a contradiction, 
however, between the two sentences in this passage, in that if the immigrants’ 
output is exported and helps the balance of payments, it will aggravate the 
excess demand at home. One may complain that immigration does not contribute 
to the balance of payments or that it increases excess demand, but we cannot 
simultaneously complain about both.
^See (14), p.395
3We should also mention here the study by Amita Dutta (19), which is a 
comparative static model designed to bring out the economic impact of 
immigration into Ceylon between 1920-38. Dutta’s computations show that each 
immigrant contributed to the value of exports (valued at 1928 prices)
Rs. 323 to Rs. 357 - where an estimated level of wages of R s . 300 was used.
It was also found that the effect on the terms of trade was adverse and very 
heavy (which she attributes to low price elasticities of supply and demand of 
Ceylon's exports), p.82.
4 . .See Jones and Smith, op.cit. p.156.
^ibid. p.157 
? ."Bohtiing ( 4 1  ) reports, for instance, that "in Switzerland the savings 
ratio stood at 60% in 1950 and 50% in 1955. Since that time it has 
decreased to 30%. External transfers amounted to 35% of the total income 
of foreigners in 1950, to 25% in.1966 and to 18% in 1970. In Germany in 
1970 external transfers in the region of 25% indicated at least double the 
savings-ratio of the indigenous population, 12.5%" (41.) p.91.
3 ibid. p.92
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on the balance of payments, though to some extent this is mitigated 
by their favourable disinflationary effect and by the possibility that i
a certain proportion of the money transferred abroad may return to the 
immigration country in the form of increased export demand. According 
to Jones and Smith, during 1961-66 New Commonwealth immigrants in 
Britain are estimated to have transferred about 7 per cent of their 
income home: this would be about £40 million.^'
In other Western European countries the propensity to save and
2the propensity to remit out of savings have been much higher . However,
although the sums involved are large, they are. hardly sufficient to have
a decisive effect on the balance of payments of the immigration countries.
As Bohning notes, whether or not the loss of foreign currency is desirable
depends on the given situation. 'h\hen the trade balance leaves the
current account in sizable surplus even after a reduction by invisibles,
countries are usually happy to see their balance of payments brought
3nearer to equilibrium by remittances" .
Welfare Considerations
The empirical evidence surveyed suggests that particularly in so far 
as the United Kingdom experience is concerned, immigration may have had
an adverse effect on the balance of payments. The question now is 
whether this is something to worry about. If the foreign exchange 
rate were free to fluctuate, the imbalance could be restored. IVhat 
would be the implications of this for the welfare of the indigenous 
population? A convenient way to answer this is to put the question 
in the context of a ’real’ model where the adjustment is through a 
deterioration in the commodity terms of trade. We know that if there 
are no distortions, a deterioration of the terms of trade means a loss 
of welfare. However, as will be shown in Chapter IV, in situations 
characterised by distortions in foreign trade^ or by a purchase tax or 
tariff, it may be that although immigration worsens the terms of trade, 
the indigenous population may get a welfare gain. Tlie empirical 
relevance of this possibility for the United Kingdom experience will then 
be examined in Chapter V.
1Because if a country can affect its terms of tradej the marginal 
costs of imports under free trade will exceed the domestic price.
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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the previous chapter I pointed to the
differing approaches of previous theoretical researchers on the one
hand and empirical researchers on the other: whereas the former have
been concerned with the effect of immigration on welfare and had used
a model where relative prices and theMoreign exchange rate are
flexible, most of the latter have assumed constraints on government
policies such as to rule out the possibility of relative price changes
and have examined the effects on excess demand and the balance of
payments. This chapter builds upon the work of the previous
theoretical contributors and develops a framework that will enable the
empirical estimation of the welfare impacts’. My approach involves a
modification of previous analyses in three ways. Firstly, whereas the
earlier writers often focused on the effects of immigration on relative
factor prices, I will examine the impact on relative commodity, prices:'
the reason is that the latter procedure is' more useful for empirical
estimation. Secondly, the distinction made by earlier ivriters between
the closed economy and open economy models is adapted to a distinction
between the non-traded and traded sectors. Thirdly, for each of these
sectors I introduce certain modifications to make the analysis more
relevant for the United Kingdom experience; these,include tariffs, taxes
and the provision of welfare services.
'
SECTION I 
NON-TRADED GOODS AND SERVICES
For purposes of the welfare analysis, the non-traded sector needs 
to be divided into two groups: one group such as public transport and
61.
1 ’housing where the services and goods are transacted at market prices !
and the other group such as education and health where the consumers 
2do not directly pay for the service and where there is no market price 
for it.
A . Non-Traded Sector with Market-Determined Prices
In order to simplify the analysis, let us assume that the prices of 
all such goods and services are determined on a perfectly competitive 
basis. In Figure IX Qh and Sh curves represent the pre-immigration 
demand and supply. The equilibrium price is OPo.
Now, allow immigration' into the model and assume for the momen't that 
immigrants contribute only to the demand. The.market demand curve shifts 
to Qh-i-m, and the price rises to 0P2. This generates an increase in the 
producer s surplus (= P0E0E3P 2) and a decrease in the consumer’s surplus 
(- P0E0CP2) : therefore the indigenous population gets a gain in welfare 
(= E0E3C').
Suppose next that immigrants contribute only to the supply. In this 
case the supply curve shifts to Sh+m and so the price falls to OP3 . This 
causes a loss in producer’s surplus (= P0E0D P 3) but an increase in the 
consumer’s surplus (=PoEoE2P3) . The net effect is an increase in welfare 
(= E0E 2D).' .
^We shall refer to tliis as market-determined prices even though there may 
be government intervention by way of taxes or subsidies.
2They pay through taxes and rate payments to local authorities etc.
0)o• iH
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F igure  IX
W elfare effects of im m ig ra tio n : T ransp o rt and New Housing Sector;
Im m ig ra tion  changes the p rice  fro m  Pg to -
Change in  consum er’ s surp lus =  P qE qAP^
Change in  p rod u ce r’ s surp lus =  P qE oBP^
Net w e lfa re  gain accru ing to the indigenous population =  A E qB
The more probable case is where immigrants contribute both to 
demand and supply. The important point now is that as long as the 
price level changes, the indigenous population will obtain a welfare 
gain. For illustration, let the price go up to OPj^ : the welfare gain 
will be ABEo.
V
It is shown in Appendix- I that the welfare triangle ABEo is equal
to;
i2
i (A-ot) 1 “ Po/Pl
Po/Pl
where _ A = the price elasticity of supply and a ~ the price elasticity 
of demand.
B . Non-Traded Sector with no Market Price for the Service
This case includes the educational and health services. The amount
of the service provided is determined by governments and consumers' demand 
determines the shadow price for the service.
In Figure X the vertical axis shows the marginal utility of, say,
the educational service. The horizontal axis shows the quantity
measured in terms of efficiency units of education. The curve sloping 
domrward from left to right is the demand curve for education: it is of 
the Blaug type, i.e. it is an aggregate of the individual demand curves
which are drawn with respect to the difference of the expected rate of
. . . . 1return on education over and above the prevailing market rate of interest.
This curve is a representative curve for the educational services as a
, ^ See [ S 3  , especially pp. 174-5 for the derivation of the demand
curve for education. See also C S l ’J Chapter 2 for the demand for 
education and the distinction between the consumption demand and investment 
,demand for education.
' -’l
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F igure  X
W elfare  effects of im m ig ra tio n  : Education and Health Services Sectors
Im m ig ra tio n  reduces the quantity available to the indigenous population 
fro m  to OQj^
U t il i ty  Loss =  QJ^EjE qQj^
Resource Cost =  Q^^EgBQj^'
r , 3 ,
whole^. We assume that the ■.lemand function implicit in the curve is 
taken into consideration by the government when deciding on how much 
money to spend on education. Assume also that the number of units 
that the government can provide with a given amount of money is the 
same as would be available if services were sold in a competitive market.
V
Suppose that if the educational service had been provided in a 
competitive market the equilibrium price would have involved OQh units 
at a price OPo; the expenditure would have been OPoEoQh. Therefore if 
the government provided the same number of units, the marginal utility 
of education would be OPo. . .
Now allow immigration into the model.- Assume that initially the 
government does not extend the educational facilities and that the 
existing OQh units have to be shared equally by the enlarged population. 
This case is illustrated in Figure X; if the ratio of immigrant/ 
indigenous people receiving education equals Q|^  Qh/^Qfi j amount of
units available to the indigenous population will be reduced to OQ^ .
The welfare loss suffered by the indigenous population will, be measured 
by the area Q|^  Q^EoEj . This area can be estimated as follows. . Consider
1 . -Ch-first the area Q;^  AEoQ^. The base Qh^Qh may be written as (Oh - 
where Cm stands for the number of educational units enjoyed by immigrants 
and Ch is the corresponding amount for the indigenous population before 
the immigration. Now if we choose units such that OPo equals unity 
Qh^Qh will measure the area of the rectangle. The area of the triangle
1 •Since the public expenditure on further education is very small compared 
with the expenditure on schooling, we take schooling as representative of 
the educational services.as a whole.
f '  •
AE^Eo can be written as:
AE^Eo = I (EoA) (E%A) = |
(1)
(Qh Qh)^
- a
where a is the price elasticity of demand.
An alternative possibility is that the government may extend the 
educational services to meet the needs of immigrants and thereby
restore the level of educational services available to each indigenous
consumer. In this case there would be no loss of utility for the 
indigenous population. However, provision of the additional services 
will involve a resource cost. Assume that these extra units can be 
obtained under constant costs: their total cost is shown in the diagram 
by the rectangle QhEoBQp, . where QhQh is equal to “  x OQh. Now 
since we have assumed OPo equal to unity, the additional resource cost
will be equal to x OQ^.
SECTION II 
TRADED GOODS
In estimating the welfare effects arising from immigrants 
contributing to the supply and demand of traded goods, I adopt the 
framework of the two^country two-commodity model used by P.B. Kenen 
( G2. ) . The rest of the worl6 will be considered as one country. 
Moreover, I will assume that immigration to the United Kingdom does not 
affect the supply and demand in the rest of the world. This assumption 
may be justified on the grounds that the majority of New Commonwealth
( D / ’in.'o -cy- where -1 -uni Pglp -%A
f'?.
immigrants have come from countries where per capita income and the 
productivity of labour are very low compared with that of the United 
Kingdom. The traded products will be aggregated into (i) import 
competing and (ii) export sectors. I will include in (i) agricultural 
products and food manufacturing, and in (ii) I will include all other 
manufacturing. The analysis for each of the cases is made complicated 
by the fact that the products are subject to tariffs and consumption 
taxes (or producers receive subsidies) and that the raw materials required 
for the production of the final consumer goods may be partly imported and 
partly produced in the United Kingdom. In order to facilitate 
exposition of the analysis, I first show a simple model in which there 
are no government distortions, i.e. no taxes, tariffs etc., and where 
the traded products consist of final consumer goods only. Later on this 
simplifying assumption will be relaxed and a more complicated (but more 
realistic) model will be considered. One advantage, of this two-step 
procedure is to show how the effects of immigration may depend 6n the 
presence of government taxes, tariffs, etc.
The. Import Competing Sector: A Simple Model
.
The curves Qh and Sh in quadrant (i) of Figure XI show respectively 
the United Kingdom’s demand and supply curves for a final consumer 
product while the curves Qw and Sw in quadrant (iii) are the corresponding 
curves for the rest of the world. In quadrant (ii) the curve Qx is the 
United Kingdom's excess demand curve while Sx is the rest of the world's 
excess supply curve. The equilibrium price is OPco: the United Kingdom 
produces OQo and consumes OQ^.
Now allow for immigration: the United Kingdom total demand and supply
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schedules become Qh+Qrn and Sh+Sm'respectively. The immigration is 
assumed to have no effect on the demand and supply schedules of the 
rest of the world. It is clear that, depending on the relative impact 
of immigration in adding to United Kingdom demand and supply, the world 
price could increase or decrease; moreover in the former case, if the 
price rise was sufficiently great the United Kingdom could become an expori 
of the product. Thus in principle there are three cases. However,-in 
order to avoid some unnecessary repetition, I will consider only the 
case of the price rise: the reason for this is that my empirical
analysis (reported in Chapter V below) shows that that is the case relevani
to the United Kingdom experience. In the figure the United Kingdom’s 
post-immigration excess-demand curve is Qx and the post-immigration • 
equilibrium price is OP^^ . This rise in price causes the' consumer’s 
surplus of the indigenous population to fall by PcoBCPc]^ while their 
producer’s surplus increases by PsoADPs^: the former will necessarily be 
of greater magnitude in the present case since the United Kingdom is an 
importer. Therefore in this case the indigenous population unambiguously 
loses welfare (=ABCD) as a result of immigration^.
This conclusion should be contrasted with that for'the non-traded 
sector depicted in Figure IX: whereas in the latter case the indigenous 
population unambiguously gains as a result of an immigrant-induced price 
change, in an open economy context there may be a gain or loss depending
on how the import price is affected.
^This conclusion, is comparable to that of P.B. Kenen’s model described
in Chapter 2.
"70'
The Import-Competing Sector: A more complicated model
I now introduce two complications to gain greater realism (i) the
United Kingdom levies tariffs on imports and also a tax on consumption
of importables arid of the import-competing product (ii) 'Some of the
imports consist of raw materials that are used in the production of the
import-competing final product. Recognition of the latter complication
makes it necessary to disaggregate the supply curve of the final product
into the raw materials and 'value added' components.^ Figure XII
illustrates the welfare effects. In quadrant (i) Sr is the supply curve
of the raw 'materials: it is an aggregation of supplies from home and 
2foreign sources . Shv is the supply curve of value added. Aggregating 
these yields the supply curve of the final product; the
construction of this curve is considered in more detail in Appendix II.
Qh is the United Kingdom's demand curve for the product while Qhc is the 
curve deflected by an ad valorem consumption tax (of DC/CQ^ per cent). 
Using Qhc and Shf we derive the United Kingdom's excess demand curve for 
the final product: this is shown by Qxc in quadrant (ii) . Sx in quadrant 
(ii) is the rest of the world's supply curve of exports to the United 
Kingdom: Sxt shows that curve inclusive of the United Kingdom's import 
tariff (of PwoPso/OPwo.per•cent). The intersection of Sxt and Qxc shows 
that the tariff inclusive equilibrium price is OPso. Transferring this 
price to quadrant (i) we see that the United Kingdom production is OQo.
In turn this shows that the price of the raw material content is OPro. 
while the price of value added is OPvo. Consumers pay the price OPco 
and demand is OQ^. The United Kingdom gets tariff revenue equal to 
PwoABPso and tax revenue equal to PsoCDPco.
^ ‘Although there is a controversy about the concept of value added, I use 
it’ here since it helps a useful purpose. See ( 07] )
2 I assume without violating reality that there is no tariff on the raw 
material imports. ■
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No w  allow for immigration. In principle the immigrants coulci be
employed either in the value added stage or in the production of the
raw materials. In actual fact, since a very small proportion of the
New Commonwealth immigrants have found employment in the mining and
agriculture sectors^ I will assume that immigrants work only in the
value added sector. Quadrant Ciit) depidts the post-immigration
situation. The curve Shv+Smv shows the supply curve of value added
*while the curve Sr is reproduced from quadrant (t). S^.^: is the supply
curve of the final product. (The relationship between these is further
discussed in the Appendix). Qh+Qm shows the post-immigration demand
curve while Qhc+Qmc shows that curve deflected by the consumption tax
*of the initial rate. From Sj^.f and Qhc+Qmc we get the excess demand 
curve shown in quadrant (ii). The intersection of Sxt and Q^ .^ gives
the post-immigration price OPs^; (in anticipation of my empirical findings 
the diagram illustrates only the possibility of a price increase) . 
Transferring the price OPs^ to quadrant (iii) we find that production is 
OQ2 , the price of the raw material is OPr^ while the price of value added 
is OPv^ . Note that the diagram illustrates an increase in the price of 
raw materials but a decrease in the price of the value added activity.
The reasoning behind this result is as follows. The increase in the 
price of the final product implies that immigration will have increased 
demand for raw materials; therefore the price of raw materials will 
increase. On the other hand, since immigration adds to the supply as welJ 
as demand for the value added activity, the price of the value added may 
decrease or increase: the diagram illustrates a fall in this price in 
confirmity with my empirical findings^ Consumers pay the price OPc^; -
1 The ruii.’.b'T •■)! ’lev; fh i ini' n t.r, v.'i)''''-!. n ,, in leu I t u r
.'ind li. ir .n ; ';  ■.••■•If;, i.n 1.1rs r r r - r  1 >t}), mi T ' n ' r
JtiHcr. r.'nd -Sml. th, nn.' c i. b. p. .
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demand is 0Q3. The government collects Ps^EFPc^ in tax revenue and 
Pw^lliMPs^ in tariff revenue. '
The net impact of immigration on the welfare of the indigenous
population is as follows. The change in consumer’s surplus = PcoPc^KD
shown in quadrant (L). The change in the surplus of the producers in the
value added sector = PvoVTPv^. The change in the surplus of raw material
producers = Rm(PfoPr^GR), where Pm is the share of United Kingdom raw
1material producers. The pre-immigration tax and tariff revenues are
respectively PscCPPc^ and PwoAhPso. The corresponding areas after
immigration are Ps^EFPc^ and Pw^NUPs^: the share accruing to the indigenou
population will be estimated on the assumption that the government
redistributes the revenues equally among all the inhabitants of the United
Kingdom. To sum up, the welfare effects of immigration are:
-PcoDKPc^+Rm(ProGPvPr^ )“PvoVTPv| +(Hd/ (Hd+Md;|(Pw^NIIPs^+PslEFPc^ )-(PwoABPso+
PsoG'
where Hd = indigenous population, Md = the immigrant population. The 
indigenous population will have an increase (decrease) in welfare 
according as the above expression is positive (negative).
The implications of this are fairly apparent,. By introducing the 
complications of (i) the imports of raw materials as well as final 
products and (ii) taxes and tariffs we see that immigration may increase 
the welfare of the indigenous population and that this may happen even if 
it increases the c.i.f. prices (and the consumer price) of the final 
product. The general point is that as with international trade, immigrât]'
1For purposes of empirical estimation this share is assumed to be equal t»' 
the share of United Kingdom producers in total supplies of the raw materia- 
during the relevant years).
I f
in the presence of distortions may either decrease or increase welfare.
The Export Sector: A Simple Model
We illustrate the welfare implications of this case with the help 
of Figure XIII. In quadrant (i) of the figure, the curves Qh and Sh 
show respectively the United Kingdom’s demand and supply curves for the 
export product, while the curves Qw and Sw in quadrant (iii) are the 
corresponding curves for the rest of the world. In quadrant (ii) Sxh 
is the United Kingdom's excess supply curve and Qxw is the rest of the 
world’s excess demand curve. The intersection of these two curves 
determine the pre-immigration equilibrium price (=OPwo): the United 
Kingdom will produce OQg, export QoQ^, and consume OQo.
After the immigration the United Kingdom total demand and supply
schedules become Qh+Qm and Sh+Sm, respectively. The ex'cess supply curve 
■*becomes . (As in the import case immigration is assumed to have noOl.lvcL
effect on the demand'^supply schedules of the rest of the world). The 
post-immigration equilibrium price is OPw^ (=OPs^=OPc^)^: the United 
Kingdom produces OQ3 , exports. Q^Qg and consumes 0Q%. The fall in price 
causes the consumer’s surplus of the indigenous population to go up by 
PcoPcjBC while the producers’ surplus goes down by PsoPs^AD: since the 
latter cliange more than offsets the former, the indigenous population 
unambiguously loses as a result of immigration, the area ABCD showing 
tlie net welfare loss.
1 . . . .  . ■I consider here the implications of a price falT because my empirical
findings reported below show that that is the relevant case to the United 
Kingdom experience.
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The Export Sector: A More Complicated Model
Let us now introduce the two complications considered above in the 
import competing case; (i) the United Kingdom levies a consumption tax 
while the rest of the world imposes a tariff on the imports from the 
United Kingdom, and (ii) the United Kingdom imports some of the raw 
materials used in the production of the exportables.
The welfare implications are shown with the help of figure XIV,
In quadrant (i) the United Kingdom's demand curve for the final product 
is Qh while Qhc is the demand curve deflected by an ad volorem 
consumption tax. The curves S|-,f , and Sr show respectively the supply
of the final product, the value added, and the raw materials. (As before 
we obtain S ^ f b y  aggregating Sr and S^y). In quadrant (ii) Sx is the 
excess supply curve of the United Kingdom (which we obtain from Shf and 
Qhc of quadrant (i)) while Sxt is the excess supply inclusive of the 
foreign tariff, Qxw is the excess demand curve of the rest of the world. 
Intersection of Sxt and Qxw gives the equilibrium price in the world 
market: this price is OPwo. The price received by the United Kingdom 
producers will be OPso. (Of this OPro goes to raw material producers 
and OPvo to value added). Transferring this price to quadrant (i) we see 
that the United Kingdom production is OQ^ and consumption is OQo. The 
government collects PsoCDPco in consumption tax revenue - the tax 
expressed as a proportion of the producer’s price being PcoPso/OPso.
The post-immigration situation is depicted in quadrant (iii). The
curve Shv+Smv shows the supply curve of value added while the curve Sr
1is reproduced from quadrant (i) . Adding these we get the supply curve
^As in the import case, we assume that immigrants find work only in the 
value added stage.
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*of the. final product, S|^|t . As previously Qh+Qm shows the demand curve
and Qhc+Qmc shows that curve deflected by the consumption tax. The
•k  ^  ^ >'cexcess supply curve is now , shown in quadrant (ii,).; shows that
. « # * #curve inclusive of the tariff. and Qxw determine the post-immigration
equilibrium price OPw^. The price received by the United Kingdom
producers is OPs^ - the price of the raw material, content is OPr^ while
the price of value added is OPvj . (Note that PwoPso/OPso = Pw^Ps^/OPs^) .
At this price the United Kingdom produces OQ^ and consumes OQ^* The
government collects Ps^EFPc^ in consumption tax revenue.. (Note that
Pc^Ps^/0P &2 = PcoPso/OPso). Transferring the prices OPc^, OPv^ and
OPr^ to quadrant (i) we find the increase in the consumer's surplus
(= Pc^KDPco), the decrease in surplus of value added producers
(PvoVTPv,j ) and the increase in the surplus of the raw material producers 
-1(=ProGRPr^,) . Of the last mentioned, the share accruing to United 
Kingdom producers is assumed to be equal to the share of their production 
in United Kingdom raw material consumption. Regarding the tax revenues 
we assume that the United Kingdom government redistributes these 
equally among the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. bringing these 
changes together we can say that the indigenous population of the United 
Kingdom benefits as a result of immigration if:
PcoDKPc^+Rm(ProGR% )“PvoVTPv^ + (Ild/(I]d+iud))(Ps^EFPc.i )-PsoCDPC(j> 0 where Rm 
= the share of indigenous raw material production in the United Kingdom 
raw material consumption, Hd = the indigenous population and Md = the 
New Commonwealth immigrants. The implication of this is that whereas in 
the simple model an immigration-induced fall in the export price would
As shown in the diagram as the Ps (or Pc) goes down the Pr goes up while 
the Pv goes down. The reason for this is as follows. After the 
immigration, as the quantity supplied of the final product goes up, more 
raw materials are demanded : the Pr goes up. Since Ps = Pr + Pv the Pv has 
to go down.
r > f
unambiguously reduce welfare of the indigenous populationj when tariff 
.
and taxes are allowed for immigration may increase the welfare of the 
indigenous population even though it may cause a decline in the export, 
price. . '
V
Summary
Our analysis of the traded sector shows that, as with international 
trade, immigration in the presence of distortions may either increase or
decrease welfare. The possibility of a welfare increase is
compatible with an increase in the import price and a decrease in the
export price, i.e. a deterioration in the country’s terms of trade. One
implication of this, which suggests a criticism of the research by Mishan 
and Needleman.among others, is that our concern should not.be with the 
effect of immigration on the terms of trade but rather on how the change 
in the latter may affect welfare of the indigenous, population.
APPlîNniX I.
Non-Traded Goods and Services: Transport and New Housing Sectors
, The empirical analysis of the welfare effect for transport and new 
housing, illustrated in Figure IX by the area of the triangle ABEo, is 
undertaken with the help of the following model.
The pre-immigration demand equation is:
(1) Qh = HdAP^yf a < 0 ,  3 > 0
where Qh is the demand of the indigenous population of the United 
Kingdom, Hd is the size of the indigenous population, i.e. number of 
heads, A is a parameter, P is the price, Yh is the per capita income of 
the indigenous population, and a and (3 are respectively the price and 
income elasticities of demand. The pre-immigration supply equation is:
(2) Sh = IlsBP^ X> 0
where Sh is the quantity supplied by the indigenous population, Ils is the 
number of indigenous workers employed in ,the sector, B is a parameter, 
and À is the price elasticity of supply^. Pre-immigration equilibrium price 
level, which we denote by P o , is determined by setting Qh =Sh; therefore
(3) Po =\^ y  HdAYg 
y' HsB
1‘Note that although the equations imply that the demand and. supply 
schedules are non-linear, we will for simplicity assume that the segments 
AEo and BEo are straight lines: the justification for this procedure is 
that the proportionate changes Pj^Po/OPo turn out to be very small. ■
The immigrants are assumed to have the same price and income elasticities 
as the indigenous population. So, we can write their demand equation as;
(/i) Qm = MdAP^Ym
where Md represents the size of the immigrant population and Ym denotes 
their per capita income. Each worker is assumed to be employed with the 
same amount of capital as an indigenous worker and that the production 
function is the same for the two groups: the price elasticity of supply 
will therefore be the same for the two groups. Then the supply equation 
of immigrants can be written as:
(5) Sm = MsBP^
where Ms is the number of immigrants working in the sector. Adding 
equations (1) and (4), and (2) and (5) we get respectively the post­
immigration demand and supply equations of the total population of the 
United Kingdom:
( 6 )  q  =  A P  (lldYfJ -I- M d Y j ^  )
(7) S = BP^(lls + Ms)
From equations (5) and (7) we find the post-immigration equilibrium 
price, which we denote by PI: ’ .
(8) P^ /  A(IldY|T + MdY^,.)
\ y  B(Hs + Ms)
Now the welfare triangle AEoB = ACEo+BCEo.= |(AC).(CEo) + i(BC)(CEo)
, O Q o | W  BC = A :0Qo/0^
'OPn / 'OPo /
we know that AC = ~ a
o
and CEo = OP^-OPo. For simplicity set OQo = OPo = 1. Then we get 
ACEo = a(OP^ -1)^ and
BCEo =  ^ X (OP^ - 1)^. Therefore AEoB = | ( X “ a )(0P^ - 1)^
«2-
APPENDIX II' . ■ ,
Traded Goods
I will proceed In two stages. First, I use a system of equations 
to find the effect of immigration on the prices of traded products. 
Following that the price changes are used to estimate the welfare impact.
A. The Import Competing Sector
The welfare effects are estimated from the following set of 
equations.
The supply of raw materials for use in the United Kingdom's 
manufacture of the final product is
(9) Sr = BrHrP^
where Sr is the quantity supplied (by home and foreign suppliers), Br is
a parameter. Hr is the number of people employed in the production of raw
materials (at home and foreign supplying countries), Pr is the price and
X is the price elasticity of supply of raw materials. The supply of
1 •value added factors in the United Kingdom is
(10) Shv = BvHvPy
where Shv is the quantity supplied, Bv is a parameter, Hv is a variable 
where meaning is explained below, Pv is the price and X is the price 
elasticity of supply of the import competing product. By choice of units 
we set Br = Bv, Note that for simplicity we assume that the magnitude of
1 , 'Although there is a controversy about the concept of value added, I use
it here since it helps a useful purpose. See for more on.
Lhc- controversy.
uthe supply elasticity is the same in the two stages of production.
The supply of the final product is:
(11) Shf = llsBPg . ,
where Shf is the quantity supplied of the final product, B is a 
parameter (and B = Br = By), Ils is the\total number of people employed 
in the production of the final product, Ps is the suppliers', price, and 
X is the price elasticity of supply of the final product. The
relationship between (9), (10) and (11) is given by the condition that
Ps = Pr + Pv
The meaning of Hv can now be explained. Since by choice of units a 
'unit quantity' of value added equals a unit quantity of the final
X X  Xproduct we have HsBPg = HvBvPy ; with B = Bv we get Hv = (1/V.A) H s , 
where V.A. == Pv/Ps, i.e. the share of value added in the final product 
price.
The demand for the final product on the part of the United 
Kingdom's indigenous population is
(12) Qhc = HdA^(i + d)^Y^ = H^dAp's Y^ = IldAP^ Y^
where Qhc is the quantity demanded, Hd is the indigenous population of
the United Kingdom, A is a parameter, Ps is the suppliers' price, a is 
the price elasticity of demand for the final product, d is the amount of 
tax expressed as a constant proportion of the suppliers' price, Yj.^ is the 
per capita income of the indigenous population, $ is the income elasticii 
of demand for the final product, Hj^  • = (1+d)^ , and Pc is the price paid 
by consumers. The United Kingdom's demand curve for imports of the final 
product is got from (11) and (12):
(13) Qxc = (Qhc - Shf)
«f''
The rest of the world's supply of the final product to the 
United Kingdom is • .
(14) Sx = (Sw - Qw) = WsBF^ ~ WdAp"
where Sw and Qw are respectively the rest of the world's supply of and
demand for the final product, Ws is the* total number of people employed
in the production of the final product (including agriculture) in the
1rest of the world, B is a parameter , Pw is the price in the rest of 
2the world , X is the price elasticity of supply of the final product,
Wd is the population of the rest of the world, A is a parameter, a is
3the price elasticity of demand for the final product, Yw is the per 
capita income in the rest of the world, and 3 is the income elasticity of 
demand.
If the United Kingdom imposes tariff on the import of the final 
product the foreign supply curve facing the United Kingdom becomes:
(15) Sxt = WsBP^ (141)^ - WdAP^ (li.t)°'Y^ 
where t is the ad volorem tariff rate, and Pw (1+t) = Ps
The United Kingdom's c.i.f. import price which, under competition, 
is also .the price of the final product received by United Kingdom 
producers is obtained by equating (13) and (15). On solving, and denoting 
this equilibrium price by Pso, we get:
We assume that A and B are the same in the U.K. and the rest of the world 
2 . .It is assumed that there is no consumption tax on the final product in
the rest of the world.2All the elasticities are assumed to be the same in the U.K. and the 
rest of the world.
(16) >
B(Hs+Ws)
The demand and supply equations of the immigrants are
(17) = M ^ A P /  ( H d ) V  = 4  At“
(18)
where Qmc is the quantity demanded by immigrants, is the New
Commonwealth immigrant population, is their per capita income,
~ ^d the quantity of the final product supplied by
immigrants, and is the number of immigrants employed in the. 
manufacture of the final product. (Recall that we assume that immigrants 
are employed only in the value added stage).
The post-immigration supply curve of the final product is:
(20) S*, =
M +H -V.A.M s s s
where V.A. is the share of the value added in the price of the final 
product before immigration. The proof of this is as follows:
In Figure XV the labels of the curves have the same meaning as in
Figure XII. Before the immigration we have AD = AC-i-AB. After immigratioi
we have Aj=AB+AG. And since DC=AB=jG we have that Dj=CG. Now the
problem is to find the extend of the proportional shift of the curve,
*i.e. . Diagramatically this means finding FN/DF. Now since
FN and since AD = 0P_ = 1 (by choice of units) we have FN _ 1, NerJ
DN "I>5 ° DN GC
GC '=/ CH j.OE where CH/EH = Ms (i.e. the proportion of immigrantV EH / '
%(DO• iHÎHA
Shf
F
'hv
E
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workers in.the total working force) and OE = the share of value added 
in the price of the final product. V.A. stands for the share of 
value.added expressed as a proportion of OP^ . We can therefore write:
Therefore
*
'hf = ^ h f ( V " s
\ m  +11 -V.A.M ] s s s /
The demand for imports after immigration can now be m'itten as
(21) Qxcm = Qhe+Qmc-Shf = < M +H s s
The equilibrium c.i.f. import price is got bÿ equating (15) arid 
(21). 'Denoting this by P we have:
• • .
(22) =>'/ a ( h X + M * Y ^ W ^ Y ® )
B \ + W
IM +11 -V.A.M _ y s s s
B . The Export Sector
The equations for the export sector are the same as in the import- 
competing case. The only difference arises because the United Kingdom, 
will have no tariff while its exports may force a foreign tariff.
Before immigration the United Kingdom demand for the final product
IS :
(12*) = HjAP^(l+d)°'Yg
The export supply curve of the final product is obtained from (11) 
and (12*):
n -
(13*) Sx = H^BP^ -
If there is a foreign tariff of, say, T per cent the export supply 
facing foreign consumers becomes :
(U*) (1+T)^  -A<p“(1+T)“y‘^ = 1I^BP^-H»f,
where = P^ (1+T)
The rest of the world’s demand curve for imports from the United 
Kingdom is:
(15*) Qxw = Ow - - "sUPt
The pre-immigration equilibrium price in the rest of the world, 
P^Q, is obtained by equating (14*) and (15*). On solving we get:
Ov-oCi
(16*)P»o^\ /A("I?h+Wd?w)
B d y w p
The price received by United Kingdom exporters is got from
P = P /(1+T) while the price for the United Kingdom consumers is got so wo  ^ ^
from P - P (1+d) .CO so
The demand and the supply equations of the immigrants are the same 
as in the import-competing case.
The supply curve of the final product is:
(20) S*j .= S , h
M^+tl -V.A.M^ s s s
The excess supply of the United Kingdom now becomes
« 9
(21*) <  ^  - (Qj,^  + Qmc)
where is derived as in the import-competing case'. The foreign
tariff means that the export supply facing foreign consumers is :
\ M * R * A
“ w ("cl^h + " d V,(23) S*j = HgBpA I
M +11 -V.A.MS S SI
Tlie equilibrium price in the rest of the world is obtained by 
setting (15*) equal to (23). On solving, and denoting this new price 
by , we get
(24) Wh
M +11 “V.A.M
And using the relationships P = P Li and P = P (1+d)w/(l+l) c^
we get respectively the prices for United Kingdom producers and consumers
WELFARE CHANGES
Having found the price changes due to immigration we can now evaluate 
the welfare changes. For convenience I reproduced Figure XII to show 
the relevant areas to be evaluated. (Since the areas involved in the 
import-competing and the export sectors are very similar, I shall évaluai' 
the areas only for the former sector). The calculations may be simplifie' 
by choosing units to set the value of the United Kingdom consumption 
in the initial year equal to unity - i.e. in Figure XII we set OP^^ = 1 
and OQj^  = 1 .
Let us start with the change in the consumer’s surplus:
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Now we know that:
P PCO c, (op “ OP ) / so Si /op so
(1+d)
I O PAlso P K = (P Ü-K D) and K D = Id 1-----—H  CO. \  OPc^
where a is the price elasticity of demand. Substituting these values 
into (Cl) we can find the change in consumer’s surplus.
The change in the raw material producers’ surplus accruing to United 
Kingdom suppliers is:
(C2) • Rin P GRP ro r^ = Rm i (0Q2 + 0(g
where R is the share of the United Kingdom raw material producers inm
the total raw material supplies of the United Kingdom. We know that:
f^oPrj \0Qo ■ Ci-V.A.) R
À So
where A is the price elasticity of supply, and V.A. is the share of the 
value added in the price of the final product.
Also OQ2 = II g BP
+H “V.A.M
M +11 s s \
\5 s s 'OQ,
where 11^  and are respectively the number of indigenous and immigrant 
workers employed in the production of the final product.
And OQ^ = " , B P j /  oh 
/  ^
Substituting these into equation (C2) we get the change in the raw 
material producers' surplus.
. The change in the surplus of producers in the value added stage
is
(C3) P . VTP = i (P P )(P V + P T). VO Vi ' VO V^' VO v^
A ■Now we .can write P , T = H B (OP -OP )
. TÏ V 81 ri
where 11^  is defined ' above .
By making use of the definition of the supply elasticity we get
=(^ 1 +222______j (l-V-A')Pso
V v ,  = - Pvi'^/OQ, (v.A.Pso)SO.
A
Substituting these values into (03) we find the change in the surplu 
of 'value added* producers.
The pre-immigration tax revenue is
(04) PcoPsoCD = (PcoPso) (PsoO)
Now PsoO = OQ^ = 1 And PcoPso, being the amount of tax as a
proportion of the producers price, can be written as OPso.d, where d 
is the rate of tax (and since Pso = 1  d is also the amount of tax.
The tax revenue after immigration is
(05) P P %F = (P P )(P E)Cl Si Cl Si Si
Now P E, being the consumption after immigration, is obtained from the 
(post immigration) demand equation and equilibrium price. P P is the
amount of tax revenue per unit quantity and is got from'the tax rate and
the producer's price.
The pre-immigration government tariff revenue is: 
(C6) = (Q^Qp
where P P is the amount of tariff duties per unit import wo so .
Finally, tariff revenue after immigration is
(C7) P NHP = (OQ3-OQ,)(P P )
1 ' 1 JL “I
where (OQ^ - OQ2) is the level of imports and can be estimated from 
the system of equations.
THE gMi’n/ticAL §ST1i’rVïATG5
THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
This chapter presents empirical estimates of the welfare effects 
analysed in the previous chapter. (The data used in the calculations 
are shown, in Appendix Tables I and 11)'*. As mentioned there the main 
industries whose supply and demand have been affected by immigration 
are public transport, new. housing, the educational and health services 
and the foreign trade sector. The empirical estimates are made for the 
years 1951 to 1966: the former is chosen•because there was little 
immigration from the New Conunonwealth prior to that year while the latter 
is the most recent year for which Census of Population data is available. 
An initial problem, common to all thesg industries, is that whereas the 
immigrants arrived in each of the years during this period some of the 
data required to estimate the welfare effect is' available for only a few 
of these years. For this reason I will proceed on the basis of two 
alternative assumptions:
Assumption I
The immigrants that arrived during 1951-1961 actually arrived in 195' 
On the basis of this assumption I will estimate the welfare impact on the 
indigenous population of 1951.
Assumption II '
All these immigrants arrivcclin 1961. This assumption permits an 
estimate of the impact of immigration on the indigenous population of 
1961. Similar assumptions are made for immigration during 1961-66.
NON-TRADED GOODS AND SERVICES SECTOR
1. Market-Determined Prices
A. Transport Services;
The welfare gain accruing to the indigenous population is shown by tin
area ABEo in Figure IX. As proved in Appendix I the size of this area
depends, among other things, on the magnitude of the price elasticity of
supply and demand and on the income elasticity of demand. For the
price elasticity of supply denoted byZA there were no estimates (to my
knowledge) available. So, my choice of values Eor A  has been quite
arbitrary. However, I tried to use as wide-ranging values as possible to
cover what I thought the possible values A  could take; I used six values
ranging between 0.2 and 2.2 with mean difference = 0.4. As for the price
.
elasticity of demand, <X , X used a range of values that encompasses those 
obtained in London Transport Board's experience over the last few years. 
(seeC T  j)' i have used six values for (X ranging between -0.24 and -0.74 
with mean difference = 0.10. The estimated income elasticity of demand,
P , for transport services is 2.48 for the year 1961 (See ( G" ) ). My
choice of values has been around this figure; five values ranging 
between 1.50 and 3.50 with mean difference 0.50.'
These elasticities give 180 estimates Of the welfare change. Table J 
shows only the highest and the lowest estimates. Thus, the top two 
figures in the first column show that if all the New Commonwealth immigran 
that came during the 1951-1961 had in fact come in in 1951, the indigenous 
population of 1951 would have enjoyed a welfare gain equal to at most .009 
per cent and at least .0013 per cent of the value of the net output of 
transport services (of that year). Similarly the figures in the first
96
Welfare gain as a % of v.al.ue of 
net output
19;?1 to 1961: Transport New Housing
Assumption I Highest .000090679 .0000310
Lowest .0000133 .00000368
Assumption H Highest .0001226)4 .000076)4
Lowest. .0000191 .00^00869
1961 to 1966;
Assumption I Highest .00011;3 .0000979
Lowest .OOOOOOO20I.1. ■ .0000031k
Assumption II Highest .0000339693 . .000020k
Lowest .00000039373k .000000689
TABLE III
Welfare effects of imigratioa: Transport and new housing sectors
4)1
column of the fifth and sixth rows show that if the immigrant population 
of 1966 had come entirely in 1961 , the welfare gain enjoyed by the 
indigenous population of 1961 would have been at least .00002 and at most 
,0143 per cent of the value of net output of the,transport services in 
1961. -
Three points about these results may be noted. First, the welfare 
impact is extremely small. Secondly the impact does not differ very 
much as between the 1951-61 period and 1961-66 period: (The arithmetic 
mean of the upper four figures' in the table, is .000060429 and of the 
bottom four figures is .000044345). This result is significant since the 
ratio of dependant to worker in the immigrant population was much higher 
in the latter period. Thirdly, even though all the estimates are very 
small they are quite sensitive to the magnitude of the price elasticities: 
the greater the elasticities, the smaller is the welfare gain. The commor 
sense reason for this is that the welfare gain depends ceteris paribus on 
the extent of the price.change caused by the introduction of immigration 
and that the higher the elasticities, the smaller is the price change.
B . New Housing
The welfare gain accruing to the indigenous population is shown 
by the area ABEo in Figure IX; the procedure to estimate this is the 
same as.in the transport sector. There were no estimates available (to 
my knowledge) for the price elasticity of supply in new housing. I 
have used six arbitrary values for it (ranging between 0.2 and 2.0 with 
mean difference = 0.4) hoping that these would cover all-the values A  coul 
^ake. As for the price elasticity of demand, o<, G.Buchanan ( 1 5  ) informs 
us that "early estimates concluded that demand for housing was very 
price-inelastic, but Muth has found price elasticities of between 0.5 and
1.0" (p.135). The values I used forex include these values: six values 
ranging between -0.25 and -1.5 with mean difference = 0.25. The above 
source informs us on the income elasticity of demand, p , as well.
"Evidence in this country is even less conclusive, since there are no
published elasticity estimates what material there is, however,
supports the estimate that income elasticity is probably around 
at present", (p.136). The estimates I used, five figures ranging between 
0.2 and 1.8 with mean difference = 0.4; include this figure.
Thus, there are 180 estimates in all. Table III reports only the 
highest and the. lowest values obtained (for each of the two assumptions 
and for each period of years). For example, the top two figures in the 
last column show that if the immigrants that came between .1951-61 had 
actually come in in 1951, the welfare gain accruing to the indigenous 
population of 1951 would have varied between .00310 per cent and 
.000368 per cent of the value of output of new housing in 1951. As in thf 
case of transport, the average welfare impacts of the first and the 
second periods do not differ very much: the average for the first period 
is .00002994 and for the second period is, .000030532. The smallness of 
the figures mean that as far as new housing is concerned, the inflow of 
New Commonwealth immigrants and their employment in new housing did not 
affect prices'in the new housing market to any important extent. This 
inference is supported by the findings of Wilkinson and Gulliver ( 6 rl ) 
".... when all factors are taken into account there is no substantial 
evidence that non-whites cause house prices to fall; either they have no 
effect or they are associated with above average prices...\In so far as 
any effect is discernible, it is to raise the level of price rather than 
to lower it" (p.35).
99'
As in the case of transport, the welfare impact is smaller the 
higher are the elasticities; moreover, the highest and the lowest 
figures for each year (relating to each assumption) are quite close to 
each other.
II. Non-Traded Goods and Services; Government Administered Prices
A. Educational Services
In this section we have two alternative measures of the welfare 
effects: the utility loss suffered by the indigenous population •
1 II(=E^EoQ^q^) and the resource cost incurred b y  the government (=E^BQ^Q^).
In our theoretical analysis we showed tliat these effects could be
measured in terms of the effect of immigration on the number of units
of educational service available to the indigenous population. The
decrease in these units, which was sho\-m by the distance OQ^ in Figure
X (which has been reproduced below), was measured as 'the ratio C, , .
m ’
where and are respectively number of educational units enjoyed 
by the indigenous and the immigrant populations. Now our problem is 
that data on and are not available. I will therefore use a proxy 
by assuming that the number of educational units received by immigrant 
per head of the immigrant population is the same as for the indigenous 
populaLian: thus I assume that where U^ , is the
indigenous population and is the New Commonwealth immigrant population
tin a particular year. We can then write ) and
I? . d d.
’^ ^h* Tben by choosing units to set OP^ = 1 we can estimate
ÏT7
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Im m ig ra tio n  reduces the quantity available to the indigenous populatio 
fro m  OQj  ^ to OQJ^
U t il ity  Loss =
Resource Cost =  Qj^ EqBQJ ’^ ' .
lOf'
the resource cost
1 > I .The utility l o s s ' Q j ^ Q j ^ . A E ^ .  Now AE^ (which 
measures the change in the 'price') can be found by using estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand. As far as I know, there are no elasticity 
estimates for health or educational services for United Kingdom. 
Fortunately though there are some estimates for educational services in 
Canada: these elasticities are “-0.2 and -1.5 depending on the estimation 
procedure . I have therefore made use of these.
The results of the calculations are given in Table I V .  For example, 
the figure in the first row, second column, shows the utility loss due 
to fewer educational units suffered by the 1951 population on the 
assumption that the■immigrants that arrived between 1951-61 actually 
arrived in 1951; correspondingly the figure in the first row, first 
column, shows the resource cost that would have been incurred if the 
government had expanded the services to meet the needs of immigrants.
The last column shows estimates of the resource cost incurred to maintain 
the health services. These figures are a reproduction of those in the 
first column since the assumptions underlying both calculations are the 
same. I have no estimates of the utility losses in this sector due to 
lack of estimates of the price elasticity of demand.
The most striking feature of these figures is that they are much 
larger than for the transport and housing sectors. Moreover, comparing 
the results for 1951-61 with those of 1961-66 shows that the extent of
^See S. Ostry ( 6,5 )
|o2I'
Educational Services HealthServices
19^1 to 1961: ResourceCost
Utility Loss ResourceCost= ~ , 2 := -1 .5
Assumption I .00667 .0068 .0067 .00667
Assumption II ,006Ii.l .006)47 .00638 .006 l|l
1961 to 1966:
Assumption I . .0176 .0181 .OI7U .0176
Assumption II .OI7I1. .0179 , .0172. . .017i|-
TABLE IV
Welfare effects of immigration: 
Educational and Health Services
I OS -
the loss increases with the size of the immigrant population.' This
result too contrasts with that for the housing and transport sectors.
This shows that owing to government intervention in the market of goods
and services, the possibility of an insignificant gain from immigration
is turned into a not insignificant loss. The results whould be taken
cautiously, however, since I have not heen able to allow for the
1relatively younger age structure of the immigrant population and their
. 2relatively lower use of the health services . Fortunately these two 
omissions operate in off-setting directions.
One other point should be mentioned regarding all the results for tin 
non-traded sector. The results are obtained by using national rather 
than regional or local data and correspondingly the welfare effects are 
expressed as a percentage of the value of national output. Critics may 
argue that since New Commonwealth immigrants are concentrated in 
certain regions or towns, the above estimates do not give the true 
picture of the welfare impact. This criticism, may be countered on the 
grounds that the areas where the immigrants have settled are the 
industrial conurbations that also account for the major part of the 
United Kingdom population^; the use of national data is .unlikely to involvi 
any significant, errors.
TRADED-GOODS SECTOR 
As explained on pages 6  6 - F  » the analysis adopts the two-commodity
A recent report on the subject provides evidence to this effect: it shows 
that the percentage of New Conmionwealth immigrants in the 0-15 age group 
has always been about 25% higher than that of the total population whereas 
the percentage in the 15-24 age group has been quite similar to that of tb 
total population. See (31.}
See (2 T )
two-country model. I will treat the United Kingdom's agriculture, food,
drink and tobacco industries as the import-competing industry and its
manufacturing industries (with the exception of food, drink, and tobacco)
as the export industry.^ The 'foreign country' in the model consists of
the United Kingdom's major trading partners. Ideally it would be
desirable to collect data for all the countries with which the United
Kingdom trades. However, as this would have been a very laborious task,
I restricted myself to the major sources of the United Kingdom imports
and the major markets of the United Kingdom exports; the United Kingdom
imported about 70 per cent of its unmanufactured and about 85 per cent
of its manufactured food imports (including drink and tobacco) from 
2twelve countries. As for the export sector, I took the OECD countries 
as the rest of the world.
The estimates of the various elasticities used in my calculations
covered the published estimates of Stone and Rowe i O G )  and the
3estimates used by M. Miller ( 3 4  ) in the case of the import-competing
^In 1951 the value of United Kingdom imports of food + drink + tobacco 
amounted to £1,298,900,000 while the exports amounted only to £161,000',000 
In 1961 the figures were respectively £1,481,800,000 and £207,300,000, and 
1966 they were £1,714,300,000 and £327,200,000. (Figures from different vo 
of Annual Abstract of Statistics). As for exports of manufacturers, their 
values were £2,273,200,000, £3,084,560,000 and £4,273,710,000 in 1951, 196 
and 1966 respectively, while the imports of manufactures in the same years 
amounted only to £884,500,000, £1,400,000,000 and £2,470,700,000, respecti 
Figures exclude 'food + drink + tobacco). Figures are from various volume 
'United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics'.
2These countries are Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Canada, Denmark,
Netherlands, Norway, Irish Republic, USA, Spain, Italy and France,
3 . ■The Stone and Rowe estimates are cited in 'National Institute Economic
Review, No.32, May 1965, p.40. Marcus Miller.uses a price elasticity of <’
for food of -0.16, and price elasticity of supply for food of 0.32^ 0.71 r
0.91. These figures, Miller says, are the figures-"implied" in the White
Papers of 1970 and 1971,
msector. As for the export sector, my estimates of the price and income 
elasticities of demand are based on the published estimates by Mrs. 
Morgan ( ^ 0 ) ^ ,  and the estimates of the price, elasticity of supply are 
based on the estimates used by Bela Bal'assa ( 4  )^.
As in the case of the calculation^ for the non-traded sector, it
seemed desirable to see whether the welfare impact was sensitive to the
estimates of the price elasticities. Accordingly I have assigned some
arbitrary values greater and less than the published estimates. By doing
this I obtain 64 x 4 (=256) alternative estimates of the welfare impact
for the import competing sector and 150 x 4 (=600) for the export sector.
However, not all these results are relevant for our purpose. Each
combination of elasticity estimates (along with the data on tariffs,
incomes and production levels) generates a particular ratio of production
to consumption: we should be interested in only those combinations of
elasticities which generate a production/consumption ratio that is fairly
close to the ratios actually prevailing in the United Kingdom. According]
I restricted myself to those results that were no more than 2 per Cent
3lower or higher than the actual production/consumption ratios . The 
results for the import-competing sector are given in Table V, and those 
for the export sector in Table VI. As for the,non-traded sector, I have 
reported only the highest and the lowest welfare estimates for each case.
]Although she.gives estimates for both semi-manufactures and finished good
for a number of countries, I have only used estimates for 'the latter.
2 'Balassa also uses some estimates of the price elasticity of demand. He
cites R.M. Stern ( )  who "assumed demand and supply elasticities of...
-0.4 and -0.2 for semi-manufactures, -0.5 and -0.25 for non-durable
finished manufactures".
3In the case of the import-competing sector the proportion of domestic 
production in the total United Kingdom consumption of the final product - 
the ratio OQo/OQp in Figure XII was .70 in 1951, while it was .71 and .75 
1961 and 1966 respectively. In the case of the export sector the correspc 
ratios were .73, .76 and .74 respectively. (These figures are my estimât? 
are based on the data in the 'Input Output Tables for the United Kingdom', 
'Annual Abstract of Statistics', and the 'Accounts of the Trade and Navigr 
of the United Kingdom', various issues. In all cases I used the net valu? 
output figures.
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ïlie interpretation, of the figures is the same as that of the previous 
tables. Thus the figure in the first row, last column of Table V 
shows that if the immigrants that came in between 1951-61 had actually 
come in 1951, the.indigenous population of 1951 would at worst have 
suffered a welfare loss equal to .008 per cent of the value of 
consumption of the final product in that year. The corresponding figure 
in the row below shows that at best the indigenous population of 1951 
would have enjoyed a welfare increase amounting to about .04 per cent 
of the value of consumption in that year^. This latter result is 
significant because it shows that, although in the absence of distortions
the indigenous population will suffer a loss if immigration causes a price
2 . . .rise", the existence of consumption tax and tariffs may turn this loss into
a welfare gain.
Averaging the results for the alternative assumptions we. see that 
the welfare loss suffered by the indigenous population during 1951-61 
was about .04 per cent of the value of consumption of the final product 
while the loss in the period 1961-66 averaged about .24 per cent. The 
relatively greater loss in the latter period is interesting because it 
coincides with the higher dependency ratio amongst the immigrants in the 
latter period.
The results for the export sector are given in Table VL The
interpretation of the figures is similar to that of Table V: the top two
figures in the last column show that if the immigrants that came during 
1951-61 had actually come in 1951, the indigenous population of that year
1The values of 04 varied between -0.10 and -0.80, ^  between 0.25 and 1.00
and of C\ between 0.32 and 0.91. '
2The sign of A1 in the first column implies a price rise.
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would have suffered a welfare Loss amounting to at most .29 per cent 
and at least .15 per cent of the value of United Kingdom production of 
the final product. Comparing the averages of the results for the two 
periods, we see that the welfare loss (as a proportion of the value of 
output) was,slightly higher in the former period. This difference, 
though not very significant, is in the?- expected direction: this is 
because the proportion of dependants in the immigrant community being 
higher in the latter period, the fall in the export price was lower in 
that period. ' .
For each-of the import-competing and export sector, I also
undertook an alternative set of calculations. Using the elasticities
underlying the results reported in tables V and VJ, I estimated what the
welfare impact would have been if the United Kingdom had had no tariffs
and taxes. The reason for undertaking these alternative calculations is
that, as seen in Chapter IV, the welfare impact may depend on the amount
of government revenues that may be distributed to the indigenous
population and moreover the tariffs and taxes may effect the absolute
price change and hence the changes in the producer and consumer
surpluses. Tables VII and Vlllgive respectively the results, of these
calculations for the import-competing and export sectors. The most
striking feature of these tables is that the figures here are slightly,
though consistently, higher than those in tables V and VL This implies
that if there had been no taxes and tariffs, the immigrant-induced
1welfare loss would have been slightly larger than it actually was .
Note that figures, relating to period 1961-66 (in tables' V and VII, and 
VI and VIIl) are closer to each other than the figures relating to period 
1951-61: the increase in the dependency ratio in the immigrant community 
brings closer the welfare impacts of the hypothetical and the actual • 
situations.
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So far I have presented the welfare impacts as a percentage of the 
production (or consumption) in particular sectors. What one needs for an 
overall judgement, however, is a comparison of the absolute magnitudes involved. 
This is shoim in Table IX. The second and third columns show the average 
welfare gains (+) or losses (-) pertaining tb the sectors shown in column one. 
The interesting point here is that the welfare impact from the traded sector 
is much larger than that from the non-traded sector. Taking the net result 
of the various changes, we find that the welfare loss amounted to £22.4 million 
per year for the 1951-61 period, while the corresponding loss for the period 
1961-66 was £55.2 million. Expressed as a proportion of the total value of net 
outputs of the sectors examined, the welfare losses are 0.14 per cent and
0.24 per cent for the two periods.
Now it may be argued that the above analysis has not covered all the 
sectors in which immigration may have had an impact - e.g. immigrant demand for 
private services may have had some benefits for certain sections of the 
indigenous population (such as lawyers, taxidrivers) while the restaurants 
offering Asian and Cypriot cuisine may have provided satisfaction to indigenous 
consumers. Although this point is acknowledged it may prove not to be very 
important since the sectors I have been concerned with above accounted through­
out the period of study for a very high proportion of the United-Kingdom G.N.P. 
In order to illustrate this I calculate the average welfare losses suffered in 
these sectors as a proportion-of the G.N.P.s.: the losses turn out to be 0.12% 
for the 1951-61 period and 0.2% for the 1961-66 period. These are only 
fractionally different from the results given above.
One important point may be emphasised. Although.the relatively larger 
loss in the latter.period coincides with the fact that the proportion of 
dependants in the immigrant community was higher in that period, this result 
does not necessarily follow from a priori considerations: as the proportion of 
dependenants increased in the latter period, the welfare loss increased in the 
import-competing sector whereas it decreased in the export sector. In the case 
of new housing and transport, the net effect is difficult to ascertain - the 
welfare gain may go up or down as the dependency ratio increases. One cannot 
therefore conclude that there is a positive relationship between the increase 
in the dependency ratio and in the welfare loss: the relative .sizes of the 
industries involved and the industrial distribution of immigrants are very 
important. • '
t Ig'
SoctorH
Public Transport 
New Housing 
Educational Services. 
Public Health Services 
IiTiport-competing Sector 
Export Sector
19^1 to 1961
+31,970
+ 8,383 
- 2,338,363 -(2,321,700)*
: -(2,103,880)* 
-1,763,613 
-16,230,900 .
1961 to 1966
+36,U73 
Hi, 396
- 12,333,200-(12,283,000)*
-( 9,668,730)*
- Hi,801,8Wi
- 18,^19,189
TABLE K
Welfare effects of immigration; Value of average welfare gain (+)
or welfare loss (-)
* value of resource cost incurred by the government
T.r/|
Suimnary and Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that immigration from New Commonwealth 
coimtries during 1951-66 has caused a small loss in welfare for the 
indigenous population of the United Kingdom. Our procedure was to 
consider separately the impact in non-traded and traded sectors: in 
the former case a distinction was m ade“between the industries where 
the price is determined by market forces and those where the government 
provide services financed through taxes.
It was found that the welfare loss was largely due to the losses 
in the traded-goods sector. Moreover, it was found that, although in 
principle the welfare effect ray depend on the rates of consumption taxes, 
or tariffs, the actual welfare effect would not have been very different 
if the United Kingdom had had a policy of free trade.
A major conclusion of our analysis is that the welfare impact 
depends very much on the industrial distribution of the immigrant 
population. Thus, if the number of immigrants employed in the housing 
and transport services had been smaller than actually was the case, the 
effect of immigration-induced rise in demand would have been greater and 
hence the, gain in producer surplus for the indigenous population would 
have been greater. Again if the numbers employed in the import-competing 
sector had been greater than actually was the case, the import prices may 
have been reduced and indigenous consumers may have gained (and this 
would have more than offset the resulting fall in producer surplus). 
Finally, if the employment in the export sector had been smaller, the 
export prices may have increased and the surplus of indigenous producers 
would have increased (and this would have more than offset the fall in
i t :
consumer surplus). This suggests that further- research should examine 
what factors determine the industrial distribution of the immigrant 
population.
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■ STATISTICAL APPENDIX
This appendix describes the sources of data and methods used to 
estimate the variables of Appendix tables I and II.
(1) From Annual Abstract of Statistics,.various volumes (Note that the 
1951 and 1966 figures exclude New Commonwealth immigrants),
(2) The reason for a .separate estimate of Yj^  and Y^  ^ is that the two 
groups may differ in the industrial distribution of employment and 
in the dependency and economic activity ratios and that this would 
be reflected in different per capita incomes for the two groups.
Define the per capita income of the United Kingdom residents in 
any year as :
(I) Y, , = ■ ^h'Hh-t-m ------------
l-l + M
where U = the number of the indigenous population ahd M = the number
• of New Commonwealth immigrant population. Yj^  and Y^^^ are respectively
their per capita incomes. Now assume that the ratio of per capita
incomes of the two groups equals the ratio of their wage earnings.
In other words Y = ^h'^m where W, and W respectively are the ra — ---  h ra ^
haverage wage earnings of the indigenous and New Commonwealth
immigrants workers. Thus we got:
Y, W
(II) Yh+m
II + M
So if we had data for W and W, we could estimate Y, and hence Y .m h h m
Unfortunately there are no published estimates of and W^. . ,
1951 1961 1966
«d (1) 50,225,000 52,372,400 52,863,700
(2)
£253 £453 £621
M, . (3)d * . 336,600 924,300.
Y (2)m £256
£473 , 
£549 . £681
Hg (New Housing) ' ' 488,844 395,365 499,507
Mg (New Housing) ^ * 5,909 11,090
Hg (Transport) 1,404,604 1,316,340 1,187,580
Mg (Transport) A 22,402 30,528
Hg (Import- 
competing 
sector)
2,017,000 1,954,196 2,165,187
M (Import- 
competing 
sector)
A 12,080 17,723
H (ExportS V * V. sector)
8,540,000 10,442,025 12,480,211
Mg (Export 
sector)
A 109,519 203,719
APPENDIX TABLE I •
Per capita income and numbers of the indigenous and immigrant populations 
Nj = indigenous population of the United Kingdom
YhMd 
Y,m
per capita income of the indigenous population
the New Commonwealth immigrant population
per capita income of New Commonwealth immigrants
number of indigenous workers in the industry concerned
number of New Commonwealth immigrant workers in the industry concern'
recall that we assume that in the year concerned there were no New
Conmionwealth immigrants
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Appendix Table II continued
Wj = population of the 'rest of the world’
W, = number of people in the ’rest of the world’ in the production of.
the commodity in question. This figure includes employment in the 
value added stage and in raw material production.
Y = per capita income in the 'rest of the world’, (Note that ’rest of 
the world’ means the United Kingdom’s major trading partners for 
the commodity in question.).
V.A,= the share of value added in the final product in the United
Kingdom. .
d = the United Kingdom’s rate of consumption tax expressed as 
proportion of the producer price.
t = the United Kingdom's rate of import tariff expressed as proportion 
of c.i.f. import price.
T = the ’rest of the world’s ’ tariff on United Kingdom exports 
expressed as proportion of United Kingdom export price.'
= the share of United Kingdom raw material production in United
Kingdom consumption of raw materials (for producing either the
import-competing or exportable final product.) .
I therefore estimated these as follows. Assume that in each 
industry the immigrants earn the same wage rate as the indigenous 
population. The estimate of is then got by weighting the 
average wage in each industry by the number of the indigenous 
population employed in the industry; similarly may be estimated.
VOne other problem concerned the choice of data for those calculations 
where we assumed that immigrants arrived in the initial year of the 
period in question. Since there is no data about the industrial 
distribution of immigrants in 1951, I calculated their income for 
that year by assuming that their industrial distribution was as at 
the end of the period in question, i.e.. 1961, and using this to 
obtain the weighted average wage for 1951, Then for consistency 
for calculations where the 1961-66 immigrants were assumed to arrive 
in 1961, I used the 1966 industrial distribution of employment and 
the 1961 wages. (The employment data are from Jones and Smith ( 2 ^  ) 
while the wage data are from 'National Income and Expenditure', , 
various issues). This procedure may be justified because, although 
evidence points to job discrimination against immigrants, there is 
little evidence of wage discrimination (See, for ins tance,(5
(3) These are the estimates made by E.J.B. Rose ( -45)..
(4) The number of people employed in the new housing sector was 
estimated from the employment and income data on the construction 
industry (of which new housing is a sub-division) and the income '•
' data on new housing: The United Kingdom employment in the'construction
industry in 1951 (for which no data was available) was estimated from
\ ' L \
the data for England and Wales on the assumption that the 
proportion of the active population employed in new housing 
was the same as in the rest of the United Kingdom. Then using 
this estimate I estimated the numbers of indigenous workers in 
new housing on the assumption that the ratio of employment in 
the new housing sector to that in'the construction industry was 
the same as the ratio of net outputs. (The employment figure 
for construction was obtained from the 1951 Population Census 
for England and Wales, Table C and Table 4. Income figures were 
obtained from the 'National Income and Expenditure'. ’ The value 
of new housing in 1951 was estimated from the 1955 data for new 
housing and the index of industrial production for the 
construction industry as a whole ~ which I obtained from the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics).
For 1961 and 1966 we have the number of indigenous and New 
Commonwealth immigrant workers employed in the construction industry 
in the United Kingdom (see Table I in Chapter I). The numbers in 
new housing were estimated on the assumption that the ratio of 
employment in new housing to that in the construction industry as a 
whole was the same as the ratio of net outputs.
(5) The data on transport is given together with the communications
industry. Therefore, to find the number of indigenous and immigrant 
workers in transport,- I made some assumptions. These assumptions 
and the sources of data are the same as in the new housing examined 
in no te'4 above.
V re
(6) IIS = the number of people employed in raw material production (i.e. 
agriculture) (Hr) and in food processing (H^). To make the 1961 
and 1966 figures comparable to that of 1951, the numbers, actually
■ employed in 1961 and in. 1966 were adjusted upwards to take account 
of the productivity increase that took place during these years in ,
the particular sector. (The llj, and 11^  figures for 1951 were
obtained respectively from 'ILO Labour Statistics .Yearbook, 1956, 
Table 130' and 'Annual Abstract of. Statistics, 1-955, Table 130'.
The corresponding figures for ,1961 and 1966 were obtained 
respectively from 'Annual Abstract of Statistics' and 'Jones and 
Smith', op.cit. Appendix Table 3.3. The data for the productivity 
increase wore obtained from 'Statistics on Incomes, Prices,
Employment and Production'. The estimates are weighted averages of
the productivity increases in agriculture and in manufactured 
foodstuffs).
As for the export sector, I used the same method of estimation and 
the same sources of data.
(7) In estimating these figures the use has been made of Appendix Table 
3,3 of Jones and Smith's (2-8 ) book.
(8) Figures obtained from various values of 'United Nations Statistical 
Yearbook'.
(9) My own calculation from the figures obtained from various volumes ' 
of. 'United Nations Statistical Yearbook', and ’Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics'.
( ^ 5
(10) Figures obtained from various volumes of 'ILO Labour Statistics 
Yearbook', 'United Nations, Growth of World Industry', and 
'United Nations Statistical Yearbook'.
(11) The share of the value added, V.A., is expressed as the ratio 
'gross domestic incomes income from employment + gross profits 
and other trading income) of the industries concerned/net total 
outputs (= total outputs-inter industry sales) of the industries 
concerned'. The figures were obtained from the Input Output 
Tables for the years 1954, .1963 and 1968, and I used the estimates 
obtained in this way for my calculations of the welfare impact in 
1951, 1961 and 1966, respectively.
(12) The,rate of tax is the 'taxes on expenditure less subsidies' 
figures for the relevant industries expressed as a proportion of 
net total input. I obtained.these from the Input Output Tables 
for the years 1954, 1963, and 1968 - which means that the rate of 
tax estimates relate to these years. As there were no other 
estimates available, I used tliem respectively for the years 1951, 
1961 and 1966. '
(13) The rate of tariff for the import-competing sector as a whole is 
got by weighting the tariff of each industry by the value added
of the industry. (The nominal tariff rates were obtained from R.E. 
Baldwin ( 5  ) and N . Oulton ( -^ 12.), and the value added figures 
from the Input Output Tables).
(14) The 'rest of the world's' tariff on United Kingdom exports is a
a:
It Y
weighted average o-f the tariffs of the United States, the initial 
six countries of .the EEC, Sweden and Japan: the average tariff 
of each of these countries (for 1962) was obtained from 
B. Balassa ( v3 ), while their G.N.P.s. were used as weights 1 
This rate was used for my calculations of the welfare impact in 
1961 and 1966. For the calculations pertaining to 1951 I used a 
slightly higher tariff rate to allow for tariff reductions in the 
1950's.
(15) As far as the import-competing sector is concerned Rm = the
■ value of United Kingdom agricultural production/the value of United 
Kingdom agricultural consumption, where agricultural consumption 
includes agricultural imports.- (The figures for the United Kingdom 
agricultural production are from various issues of the 'Annual 
Abstract of Statistics', and the figures for the agricultural imports 
are from various issues of 'Trade and Navigation Accounts of the 
United Kingdom' and 'United Nations Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics').
In the case of the export sector Rm = value of United Kingdom raw 
material production/value of United Kingdom raw material consumption, 
where the denominator includes United Kingdom raw material imports. 
Now,, although the data on raw material imports was available (from 
'Annual Abstract of Statistics'), there was no data available on 
the United Kingdom, raw material production (used in the production of 
manufactures). Therefore, in the calculations I used my own estimates 
of these. To obtain the required figures I followed the following 
■procedure: if we know the value of output, the share of the value 
added in the value of output, and the value of raw material imports,, 
we also know the value of United Kingdom raw material production.
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